Mobilization and Socialist Politics in Chile

edited by Benny Pollack



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INTRODUCTION

Chile is the only Latin American country to have had strong workers' political parties of the European type. Together, the Communist and Socialist parties have controlled the main trade unions, student unions and peasant associations for long periods from the 1930s onwards. Furthermore, they have attracted votes from around 30% of the national electorate over the last 40 years. Finally, they were the main parties of the Popular Unity (UP) coalition, which elected the first Marxist to the Presidency of any western hemisphere country.

This phenomenon has been possible because of the long tradition in Chile of participatory democracy which shaped a political culture characterized by a high degree of politicization at all levels of society. The existence of a strong, conservative, Catholic Church closely identified with the State, regional and factional infightings prompted both by geography and *caudillismo*, and weak, ineffectual governments manipulated by elites, have been typical of Latin America since Independence. Chile (and probably Uruguay), however, has been a notable exception to those trends. This allowed it to develop a strong presidential system whose power was nevertheless always curbed by a dynamic two-house Parliament, and a competitive party system that resembled the French Third Republic, without its vices. Strong trade unions, and a significant degree of political participation have been other important features of Chile for much of its history.

The military coup of September 1973 radically altered this tradition, though the Armed Forces did in fact intervene, overtly or openly, before. Their "discretion" to do so before 1973, was probably due more to the "flexibility" of the Chilean dominant classes than to the assumed "professionalism" of the Armed Forces. This flexibility was possible and desirable from their own point of view, as long as the bargaining processes inherent in all competitive, liberal democracies enabled them to keep Chile's structure of domination basically unchanged. Once the terms of the political game began to change and the balance of power shifted towards the new radicalized social classes and their parties, the system could no longer be viable, and had to be replaced. In this context, the first and more urgent task for the new military government was to suppress, as quickly and drastically as possible, those pressure groups and movements responsible for the changing patterns of participation and mobilization, especially the Christian Democratic party and the Popular Unity parties.

This collection of articles concentrates on one of these, the Socialist party, and on the participatory and mobilizing potentialities unleashed by the Christian Democratic government of 1964-1970. It is difficult to imagine the triumph of the UP in 1970 without the previous Christian-Democratic experience. To a significant extent the military coup of September 1973 was not a reaction against the "Marxist" government of Salvador Allende only, but also one against the new forms of participation inaugurated by Frei in 1964 and further developed by Allende during 1970-1973. The abrupt changes in the terms of reference of the political game in Chile pushed forward by the Christian Democrats (agrarian reform, incorporation of the marginal sectors into the political system, democratization of the forms of political participation, increased levels of political mobilization and awareness), and the furthering of them by Popular Unity, is one of the main themes of the first article. Its consequence was an accelerated increase in the level of political expectations that contributed, in turn, to a radicalization of the electorate towards the left. Paradoxically, the Popular Unity coalition was unable to cope with this, the very reason for its rise to power. When the constitutional government was overthrown in 1973, the UP had not one, but several, and sometimes conflicting tactics and strategies to offer, while the right, efficiently helped by Henry Kissinger's "destabllizing" programme, successfully mounted its subversive operation.

The other two articles deal with the most relevant of the political actors within the UP: the Socialist party, which had had a development of its own, completely independent of that of the Communist party. But this independence did not preclude a policy of understanding and alliances between the two, a pattern exclusive to Chile with no equal in Latin America. Only in the cases of Guyana, France and Italy can similar features be observed. Why this has been so is not easy to answer, as the historical pattern elsewhere has been one of continuous rivalry and even antagonism among Socialists and Communists. However, it is at least clear that the long-standing, self-proclaimed Marxism of the Socialist party is an important factor. There has always been a diffuse, Social-Democratic tradition within the party, and this obviously has strengthened those fractions working for close relations with the Communist party. The successive *isms* captivating the Socialists' imagination since the founding of the party (Latin Americanism, Titoism, Nasserism, Maoism, Castroism) have normally – but for a few periods – encouraged a policy of alliances with the Communist party.

The Chilean Socialist party considers itself a Marxist and a Leninist party. Whether it has been organized along the line of the classic leninist cadre model or not is another matter, and is discussed in the second article.

Finally, the issue of the party's performance as a contender for influence and power is examined in the last article.

Benny Pollack, Liverpool,
January 1980.

CHAPTER I

POLITICAL STRATEGIES AND MOBILIZATION IN CHILE, 1963-1973

by

Benny Pollack and Hernan Rosenkranz

This essay analyses the body of political strategies formulated in Chile from 1964 with the inauguration of the Christian Democratic government of Frei until the coup d'etat of 11th September 1973, which interred not only the 'Chilean Road to Socialism' but also the liberal-democratic forms that had characterized the Chilean political system for more than a century.

In spite of the clear differences between the Christian Democratic (DC) model from 1964 to 1970 and that of Popular Unity from 1970 to 1973, a thread of continuity links them. Both were characterized by the increased participation of new sectors in the process of representative democracy and by the diffusion of various development and industrializing ideologies.[1] The process of political mobilization, and the ideological transformations that accompanied it, essentially reflected the displacement of the axis of capital accumulation from a 'traditional' imperialism characterised by the control which the North-American bourgeoisie exercised over the production and international marketing of the agro-extractive resources of Latin-American countries, towards a 'modern' imperialism based on the domination of the Latin-American economy by the urban industrial sector.[2]

We argue that the coup of 1973 was not merely a reaction against the 'Marxist government' of Allende,[3] but above all a reaction against the wider process of political mobilization and change in developmental strategies initiated in the sixties. Furthermore, we argue that the coup confronted a Left devoid of a defined tactical and strategic model: indeed, that the Popular Unity programme was ruined by the internal divisions within the Left itself and that this immeasurably facilitated the united offensive of the Right and of Imperialism.

In 1964, the triumph of the Christian Democrats revealed that in Chile a political coalition like FRAP (left-wing front which expressed solely the aspirations and interests of the proletarian social forces), was not in a position to attract sufficient support to elect a president. This view, persistently maintained by the Chilean Communist Party (PC) virtually from its foundation, was graphically explained by the Secretary General, Luis Corvalán, in his report to the Party Plenary of April 1969.

> To all intents and purposes what we offered the country in 1964 was a socialist-communist government. All that has been said about us losing that year's election because of the enemy's campaign of mystification, is a partial explanation which does not go to the heart of the problem. From the enemy we ought to expect the worst. The truth is that then the country wasn't ready to give us communists and socialists majority backing to direct its destinies on our own. It is our assessment that this situation has not sufficiently altered and that, therefore, we ought to incline towards a popular movement and government with a broader social and political base.[4]

The Chilean Socialist Party (PS), on the other hand, clung tenaciously to its *Workers' Front* thesis, though at different periods it went under different labels. The original premise underlying it acquired its most complete formulation during Raul Ampuero's term of office as Secretary General in the fifties and early sixties, and postulated an exclusively working-

class political leadership of the popular movement. In opposition to the communist theses, which advocated a broad social leadership of the left-wing movement, the socialists put forward an inflexible policy of proletarian leadership, to which other related social sectors might attach themselves.

The first difference between communists and socialists lay not in the problem of the popular movement's electoral and political support, but in the question of its leadership. The second turned around the question of how the middle sectors might be incorporated into the popular movement.[5]

As Luis Ratinoff observes, the dynamism of the middle sectors depended almost entirely on the various policies set in motion by state action.[6] The processes of modernisation, the successive expansions of public institutions and units of production, the improvement of living conditions, the growth of the market and of opportunities, all of which were profoundly dependent on government practices, radically affected the middle stratum's possibilities for growth and social mobility.

According to Ratinoff, the middle stratum's process of growth passed through two phases. The first stage was one of ascent, in which they adopted a position of social reformism, preached policies and ideologies which were interventionist and industrialist in character, leant on the working-class masses for support, and thus succeeded in promoting their own expansion by gaining access to the management of commercial, financial and industrial activities. In Chile this stage corresponds to the period of the Popular Front inaugurated in 1939, and to the implementation of ambitious policies of industrialization undertaken by the government with the help of state corporations, together with the expansion of the country's educational structures.

In the second stage, however, they entered into a compromise with the traditional elites, lost their reformist drive, and became politically, socially, and economically committed to maintaining the existing order. This explains the ideological oscillations and increasing subsequent polarisation towards the Right experienced by the traditional middle-class parties – the Radical Party especially, and the Agrarian Labor Party. But the promotion of the middle sectors was effected without recourse to modern forms of social coordination. The mechanism for improving and maintaining middle-class status remained political *patronage*. The Radical Party, taking on a prebendary orientation, was towards the sixties no more than a party of civil servants. The new ranks of the middle-classes, excluded from the traditional forms of promotion and mobilised by the discontent caused by economic stagnation, shifted towards a new political movement which erupted with great dynamism on the Chilean scene – the Christian Democratic Party, which presented new reformist positions and created a structure typical of mass parties.[7]

The electoral support of the Left in the presidential elections of 1964 came fundamentally from the industrial proletariat and from important sectors of the peasantry, but also from some factions of the radicalised middle-class which were not significant numerically. The Left had been unable to enlist significant numerical support from the middle sectors,[8] but at the other end of the scale the petering out of the industrialisation process based on import substitution and the constant crises of the export system led to a situation in which the traditional Radical, Conservative and Liberal parties, devoid of up-to-date ideological definitions and an adequate national structure, virtually disappeared from the political and electoral scene.

Thus the Christian Democrats were able to win the votes of very heterogeneous social groups: the traditional ruling classes, who had little alternative; the middle strata; some sectors of the industrial and a semi-industrial proletariat; and, finally, the marginal urban sectors, who had previously constituted a pool of support fundamental to the right-wing parties.[9]

The political models of the Left and the Christian Democrats in 1964

The Christian Democratic model seemed to represent an alternative to Marxism. Its modernising and participatory proposals constituted a powerful, cohesive force on the fluid Chilean political scene at the very period when the revolutionary ferment coming from Cuba was acquiring an ideological consistency capable of projecting this process towards the world outside.

Frei's government from 1964 to 1970 offers an interesting example of the limitations which confront social reformism within the framework of advanced neo-capitalist concepts. It attempted to produce an alliance of classes capable of providing the consensus necessary to achieve a set of modernising reforms which, under the attractive veneer of popular participation not practised in Chile until then, would make possible the construction of a new system of social and political relationships. However, the new state was to be no more than a reflection of the old bourgeois apparatus. Its ideology reflected the orientation of the papal encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno*, whose social content shook the conservative catholic edifice of the thirties. Formulated in 1931, the encyclical came to constitute the central ideological base on which was built a body of ideas that later gave birth first to the National Falange and then to the Christian Democrats.

This ideology views the process of social transformation as the search for consensual harmony. Whether expressed or not, this position entails achieving an understanding between capital and labour, and hence involves camouflaging class conflict by feigning a harmony of interests.[10] Thus, instead of transforming the structure of domination in the interests of the oppressed class, the antagonism is reconciled under the banner of a putative social co-operation.

While the populist language of the DC seemed to foreshadow important changes in structures, the concrete programme of action did not go beyond a set of modernising, neo-capitalist and participatory measures which, though far from radical, nonetheless expressed longings inherent in important sectors of Chilean society. The basic programme acquired shape when President Frei delivered his first message to the National Congress in 1965.

In the area of participation he laid emphasis upon the need to extend the co-operative movement, introduce more participatory forms of municipal government, and consult with the trades unions. In the field of economic development stress was given to the need to reduce inflation, redistribute income through tax reforms, introduce agrarian and educational reform, and 'Chileanize' copper which remained the main national export and pivot of the economy and up to that point, was still American owned.

A year after his accession to the presidency, Frei received the support of the electorate, and obtained an absolute majority (and, therefore, control) in both branches of the Chilean Parliament. This was the first time in the country's history that a single political party had

enjoyed such a majority and the government now had in its hands the opportunity to implement what it had promised.

At this time Chile's social, political and financial position was particularly critical. The emphatic failure of the traditional Right (the Alessandri administration) unsuccessfully endeavoured to revitalise the country's economic activity by the introduction of measures of a liberal-Manchester School complexion in a vain attempt to diminish the tendency towards state capitalism supported by previous governments in 1938-1958. This drove the electorate to opt en masse for two great reformist and modernising alternatives: the Left and the Christian Democrats. The traditional Right, conscious of its weakness, opted almost at the last moment to support the lesser 'evil' of the two candidates, after failing to revive through the candidature of Julio Durán, a conservative coalition which would attract the undecided middle sectors. The massive diffusion of the idea of *revolution,* which was used by both reformist strategies (though in different contexts), inevitably had the effect of contributing to mass aspirations with a high ideological content. The need of participatory aspirations was sown in fertile soil.

What results were achieved by the DC experiment? Even judged by reformist standards, the agrarian reform did not come up to the expectations created by the government's publicity apparatus. Frei promised to hand over land to a hundred thousand families, but did so only to less than twenty-five thousand. Agricultural production, measured in absolutely conservative terms, did not increase to the extent which was expected from a reform which continually laid great stress on efficiency but achieved only an annual growth rate of 2.8 per cent between 1964 and 1970. On the other hand, the'Chileanization' of copper, which enabled the government to establish a system of mixed ownership with the North-American companies, meant the disbursement of several hundred million dollars, without taking into account the enormous sums taken out of the country in the form of un-reinvested profits.

It was in the field of popular participation that the Christian Democrats made a major contribution to the Chilean political process. By giving an impulse to grass-roots organisations – mothers' centres, neighbourhood councils, peasant co-operative organisations – it permitted the development of new forms of expression of the interests of the masses. After a difficult beginning, these organisations proliferated in time, embracing an increasingly wider spectrum and acquiring more functions. The receptiveness of the left-wing parties to these new forms varied according to each party and each sector, but nonetheless permitted the organisations to grow and become progressively stronger. This facilitated an evolution which was to culminate in the establishment of militant combat organisations among the masses such as area industrial committees (*cordones industriales*), peasant commando groups, and communal commando groups, in which the Popular Unity government was to find its greatest pool of support.

But despite considerable social support and a programme of reasonably progressive reforms, the Christian Democrats were unable to transform the oligarchic structure of Chilean society. In part this reflected their internal contradictions. It is indisputable that the party was made up of heterogeneous social forces. Alongside important popular sectors (industrial workers, peasants, and marginal poor) there coexisted significant managerial groups, associated with the construction industry, finance, and new forms of imperialist penetration. Modern in mentality, influenced by North-American technology, professedly efficiency-minded and claiming to be 'apolitical', these sectors acquired sufficient influence

over the party bureaucracy to transform the idea of a 'revolution with freedom' into the manipulation of freedom to prevent revolution.

Being a multi-class party, it was the prisoner of the diversity of objective class interests represented among party workers and the leadership. Its conservative sectors –which, since they were not conservative in the traditional sense, could be paradoxically labelled conservative-progressives – moderated the content and intensity of the proposed changes, and manoeuvered to produce a set of reformist measures which left the structure of domination fundamentally untouched.

If their internal contradictions were decisive, their connections with imperialism were no less important. How was the party to push forward the replacement of the capitalist state by a non-capitalist one, if at the same time it was tightening economic and financial relations with North-American aid organisations, the tied nature of whose loans are well known? How was it to reconcile a communitarian revolution with the Alliance for Progress, whose clear goal was to prop up a modern capitalism in Latin America?

The model failed in Chile as a means of peaceful change because its contradictions were so pervasive that it was never able to mobilise sufficient consensus to permit it to wield the immense power it had accumulated. As María Francisca Ide points out, the reforms promoted by the DC experiment aroused the discontent of very different sectors: the workers, because of wage controls; the middle classes, because of higher taxes; the landowners, because of agrarian reform; and the managerial class, because of the requirements which they had to meet for concessions.[11]

Thus, the party's performance forced its more advanced sectors to revise its ideological apparatus, with a view to achieving even more modernising positions than those which typified it as a merely neo-capitalist, reformist and populist-participatory party. These efforts, born of pressure from the lower sectors, were to take on an almost revolutionary character at certain moments, though the phraseology employed did not mask the persistent influence of social-Catholic thought. Bosco Parra, then one of the DC's left-wing deputies, went so far as to propose a model for establishing a new society characterized by the coexistence of communitarian and capitalist enterprises under the political leadership of the proletariat.

The progressive wing of the DC presented a detailed blueprint in 1967, entitled 'Proposals for political action 1967-1970, for a non-capitalist development process',[12] which emphasised the need to nationalise the coal, nitrate, steel and electricity industries; to establish state commercial agencies; to clarify the law regarding the private sector and foreign investment; to rectify labour policy and to increase the participation of workers in the running of state enterprises; to democratise power by setting up neighbourhood councils, provincial federations and peasant organisations on a massive scale; and finally, radically to speed up the agrarian reform. In the middle of the year, they even managed to overthrow the official leadership and to take over the executive. But it was fruitless. In the middle of 1969, after the official leadership succeeded in regaining control of the executive, part of the progressive sector of the DC abandoned the party to form the Movement for Popular Unitarian Action (MAPU), which later was to form part of the Popular Unity Front.[13]

In 1964 the DC was opposed by an uneasy alliance of the Left: the Front for Popular Action (FRAP), which brought Chile's two principal working-class parties together behind a basic programme. By agreeing to a set of minimum proposals, socialists and communists were not revamping the Popular Fronts which were formed in France, Spain and Chile in the thirties and which represented a multi-class alliance of middle and proletarian sectors. In 1964 FRAP formed an exclusive class front which did not include those sectors which at that time expressed in one way or another the interests of the middle strata. Till the end, the Radical Party backed the candidature of Julio Durán, but an important segment of this party's floating support – mainly small and medium farmers, businessmen and artisans – switched their support to Frei, who had already received the unconditional support of the Right (the Liberal and Conservative parties, which were later absorbed into the National Party).

The Left opposed the Frei government in various ways. The attitude of the Socialists was based on the proverbial rejection of the inevitability of a bourgeois-democratic phase of the revolution, for they had always denied the progressive character attributed to the national bourgeoisie. Thus, the development of a modernising, managerial bourgeoisie associated with construction and modern industrial activities enabled the socialists to envisage the emerging identification between these sectors and the Christian Democrats. While the traditional Right dug in behind its obsolete parties, the modernising sectors, with their rejuvenated capitalism, astutely chose to secure important positions in the Christian Democratic leadership which permitted them to moderate its reformist actions. But the opposition of the Socialists to the Frei administration was categoric.

This did not prevent a group from the University of Concepción from breaking away from the Socialist Party in 1965 to found the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), which spear-headed an even more virulent opposition, and carried out some armed activities. MIR, which gradually won a certain amount of support among the popular sectors, rejected what it deemed to be the economistic reformism of the 'official' Left and the liberal-democratic forms of political participation in which it was involved.

The communist opposition was the most moderate. Clinging to their concept of a national-popular revolution as a preliminary to the socialist revolution, the communists never dismissed the possibility of an understanding with the Christian Democrats, aimed at broadening the social base for a strategy of change, and they unsuccessfully attempted, by 1970, to form a broad coalition which would include the Radicals and Christian Democrats. The idea, which was also favoured by the Christian Democratic candidate, Radomiro Tomic, collapsed because of the stubborn rebuttal by both the Socialists and the more conservative sectors of the Christian Democrats.

The Revolution of Rising Expectations

The 'revolution of the middle classes', symbolised by the DC, had succeeded in mobilising the vast popular sectors, which until then had been astutely manipulated in every electoral contest by the traditional politicians. The Christian Democrats, who aspired to govern for at least 30 years, understood that if they wished to constitute a permanent political alternative, they must oppose the electoral patronage on which the oligarchic right staked its fortunes, and promote the mobilisation of the peasants, the middle sectors and the marginal urban sectors. In instigating this project, they had shown boldness and imagination. The Chilean Left, clinging to rigid orthodox interpretations, had for the most

part limited itself to appealing to industrial workers, without understanding the role which the peasants and the other urban sectors must necessarily play in any realistic strategy intended to dislodge the old oligarchy from centres of power. Nor had the Left devised any other forms of political organisation than the traditional ones – the political parties and trades unions. This was only one consequence of the short-sightedness which prevented it from perceiving the role of other social strata.

On the other hand, the Frei government, unencumbered by orthodox political prescriptions, showed itself highly pragmatic. Mothers' centres, neighbourhood councils, parents and guardians' centres, in short, novel forms of social and political organisation were established among the urban sectors which until then had no opportunity to participate in the political life of the country. Significant reforms of the Electoral Law (votes for the illiterate, reduction of the minimum voting age) were to ensure that these newly mobilised sectors would henceforth be politically mobilized. In the countryside, the agrarian reform was pushed forward and the peasants organised into unions. Government offices, such as the Agrarian Reform Corporation (CORA), the Institute for the Development of Agriculture and Fisheries (INDAP), and the Office of National Planning (ODEPLAN), recently created in the wake of the 'development rage', were now staffed with professionals and technicians (economists, sociologists, political scientists, planners, and agronomists), who until then had seemed condemned to live furtively in the nooks and crannies of society, but who now displaced sectors of the traditional, client bureaucracy. Adequately endowed with autonomy of finance and functions, these development offices devoted themselves to tasks of political agitation and mobilisation with singular success, both in the rural and marginal urban sectors.

Part of the state apparatus tended to become a mere appendage of the Christian Democratic Party: as bonds were forged with the new forms of political organisation which had been created, this opened the doors of social mobility and prestige, power and wealth to the Christian Democrats, while shutting them to outsiders. Attention has rarely been focussed on this facet of the DC model, though it is there that its possibilities of success were largely concentrated. The DC truly represented a new style in the Chilean political system.

The DC had promised a revolution which turned out to be not one of structures, but one of aspirations. The metapolitical catch-word of the sixties was 'revolution'. Everyone talked revolution, especially in the Santiago cafés. Revolution had detached itself from the anarchist or Marxist contexts to become a vaporous, floating notion of populist language. The DC also had its revolution. There was the 'revolution with liberty', the 'revolution of the middle classes', the 'revolution of aspirations'. Everything was revolutionised, except the economic structure. A revolution of aspirations meant the development of a massive industrial consumer society, the creation of a vast home market in which all would compete as intelligent middle-class consumers. The type of middle class to which the DC appealed, therefore, was basically of a consumer category. Marxist class solidarity, based on the possession or deprivation of the instruments of production, was replaced by the Weberian solidarity of class position, based on the possibilities of access to the market. Hence the party, the mothers' centres, the neighbouring councils, the rural colonies, the co-operatives, initiated a prolific distribution of cookers, sewing-machines and refrigerators among their members, who were thus 'raised' to the ranks of the middle class (transistor radios had been democratised on a massive scale under the previous government, and did not imply status mobility).

The 'revolution of aspirations' was a revolution of styles of consumption; the object of mobilisation was the market. But to create a home market in which the rural and urban sectors would compete as intelligent middle-class consumers required embarking on reforms which had to be fairly extreme. In effect, this political model – inspired as it was by ECLA's development concepts, and by the Alliance for Progress, and developed by a team of technocrats and planners – rested on the confidence that it was possible to achieve an accelerated and consensual development of the home market, the industrialisation process and of agrarian reform. This confidence was certainly unfounded. In fact, it was inevitable that there would arise a clash of sectoral interests – in the sense that Mamalakis uses this concept.[14]

It has been claimed that the DC experiment unleashed a process of mobilisation that went beyond the desired limits, but this is inexact. Rather, the 'revolution of expectations' foundered in its own terms, because it involved a clash of sectoral interests – between the urban and rural sectors, between industrial capitalism and latifundia agrarianism, between native and metropolitan bourgeoisies, which the model was incapable of resolving.

In short, the Christian Democratic project, which produced a vast movement of popular ferment, frustrated aspirations after first revolutionising them. Middle-class Chile (the middle-class was the one that all Chileans had learned to identify with psychologically) proved to be an illusion. The industrial consumer society was not open to everyone, but carefully selected its clients, who in the end were the same as always.

Vast sectors which had previously been marginal were now organised and politically mobilised, and exhibited an unsuspected aggressiveness. They felt cheated, but began to perceive that they were in a position to participate in the decision-making process. Various strategies opened up: first by the classic strategy of the Right, who wished to return to the golden precept of 'restricted democracy', obliterating the whole process of mobilisation unleashed by the DC; secondly, the strategy of 'representative democracy with total participation,' which recognised that the effective incorporation of the marginal sectors into the nation's economic, cultural and political life was an irrevocable fact, and that the question was now how to synchronise the 'revolution of aspirations' with the economic and technical possibility of raising the standard of living. This second strategy offered two variants: on the one hand, there was the political model of the progressive sectors of the DC, represented by Tomic, who were frustrated by the turn that events had taken under the Frei government, and saw in the 1970 electoral contest a possibility for rectifying the situation; then there was the strategy of Popular Unity (UP), also rooted in the Christian Democratic experiment, which aimed at deepening the process of political mobilisation and representative democracy with total participation.[15] At the same time some UP sectors foresaw that it might perhaps be necessary at some stage to pass to a 'national-popular' type of revolution.[16]

It is fruitless now to speculate about what destiny might have had in store for the classic strategy of the Right if, Alessandri had won an electoral victory. It seems patently obvious that it was doomed to failure, but there had not yet been invented in Chile the totalist right-wing strategy which currently dominates every form of social organisation.[17] Conventional wisdom suggests that in 1970 the Right committed the mistake of dividing its forces by presenting two candidates, Alessandri and Tomic. Thus, according to the MIR thesis, in which the electoral path to power is not viable, the election of Allende was an error of calculation. But it is doubtful that the Right would commit errors of such

magnitude when it came to the manipulation of elections. In 1970 the Right was on the defensive, clinging to obsolete strategies, and incapable of mounting an up-to-date offensive to meet the challenge represented by the mobilisation of the urban and rural strata.

On the night of 3rd November, 1970, when Allende formally assumed the Presidency, foreign journalists witnessed a colourful spectacle. The old Alameda de las Delicias, the heart of Santiago, was crammed with groups of people who danced, sang aggressive slogans and carried torches. The television cameras presented popular singers and entertainers and interviewed the people in the street. Never before had there existed such a massive feeling of national communion. But on what were they communing? A plethora of sectors expressed their contagious enthusiasm before the TV cameras (which belonged to the traditional, aristocratic and exclusive Catholic University of Santiago): pensioners, seamstresses, maids, artisans, industrial workers, students, artists, sociologists, small shop-keepers, taxi drivers, minibus drivers, hair-dressers, waiters. This enthusiasm was not ahistorical, and was not unconnected with the revolution of expectations, as the present Chilean Military Junta has clearly understood. Their thoughts were on the heaven of the industrial market. In spite of everything, *middle-class Chile in limbo* was going to have a second opportunity.

The uneasy consensus of Popular Unity

Five political parties, which historically had followed distinct courses, were now to embark together under the banner of Popular Unity.

The Chilean Socialist Party, founded on 19th April 1933, had absorbed all the ideological polemics which shook the contemporary left: it was successively – and at most times simultaneously – Trotskyist, Titoist, Maoist, Castroist. In spite of its rigid official position – the Workers' Front – it joined the Popular Front in October 1938 and the personalist government of Carlos Ibañez in 1952, though for a short period in both cases. Haunted from birth by the eternal populist temptation, it retained its inclination towards charismatic leaders and a diffuse and emotional ideology which, at crucial moments, created a state of collective enthusiasm. Its basis of support was wide – groups of urban workers, members of the intelligentsia and professions, peasants, and lower middle-class fractions. Moreover, it was the obvious refuge for the marginal urban sectors who had moved from the Christian Democrats towards more extreme positions. The Socialist Party's initial anti-communism had been watered down, though it was never totally eradicated. The supporters of this party, perhaps more than those of any other, thought on the 4th December 1970 that the Party's aspirations were about to be consummated.

The Chilean Communist Party was founded in 1924 by the now legendary Luis Emilio Recabarren. This party, one of the most faithful supporters of the idea of the Popular Front advocated by Moscow, actively backed the establishment of the Popular Front in Chile, and, from 1958 at least, preached the inevitable need for a common policy with the Socialists. Its support was recruited from amongst the urban industrial working class.

By means of the so-called 'socialist-communist polemic', both parties succeeded in establishing a consensus which enabled them to create the FRAP coalition and to launch the presidential candidature of Salvador Allende in 1964 and again in 1970.[18] The polemic's starting point was the role of the Communist Party and the Soviet Union. The socialists did not attribute to the Soviet Union a leading role in the world revolutionary movement, but while the communists recognised the need for Chile to find its own path

to socialism, they saw the Soviet Union as the vanguard of the anti-imperialist struggle. International bloc politics was the second great theme of the polemic. This was rejected by the Socialists, who maintained a position similar to the Chinese thesis, which divided the world into developed and under-developed countries and not into socialist and capitalist countries. The third major question dealt with the possibility of gaining access to government and power by peaceful means. In 1962 the then Secretary General of the Socialist Party, Raul Ampuero, dismissed this as a 'source of confusion,' but two years later the Socialist Congress held in Concepción acknowledged that 'we will fight the elections, because there exist favourable conditions for winning them and because by winning them, we can open a new phase in the development of the Chilean revolution. Besides, *objectively there exists no other option.*' [19]

The electoral defeat of 1964 provoked further doubts among the socialists, and in 1966 they announced that 'in Chile, the collaborationist policy extensively practised by working-class parties seems, after two decades of constant failures, to have exhausted its possibilities'.[20] But in practice, the socialists never put aside the weapon of electoral participation, nor did they reject broad fronts with the formal participation of the lower and even middle bourgeoisie. However, the Chillán Congress of 1967 defined the Socialist Party as a party even further to the left of the PC, by establishing the quasi-inevitability of armed struggle to gain access to power in Chile.

The Radical Party, to which we have already referred, was founded in 1861. Blanksten has defined it as a traditional and pragmatic party.[21] In fact, its ideology became more diffuse and elastic as the old cleavages on which it was founded – constitutional reform, state control of education, decentralised administration, universal suffrage, and anticlericism – lost their historical validity. Its support was drawn mainly from the lower and middle reaches of the traditional middle class (secondary-school teachers, retail businessmen, the traditional bureaucracy, doctors, lawyers), some sectors with important public or semi-public posts among whom bonds of patronage were still strong (judges, notaries), and some of the peripheral bourgeoisie enriched by speculation in real estate and insurance. Also to be included are immigrant groups – Spaniards, Italians, Arabs, Jews – who had set up small businesses or industries and had prospered, and were perhaps attracted by the PR's spirit of ethnic tolerance. This party fulfilled the function of promoting the interests of the middle classes in their period of ascent. In time it became an electoral machine involved in opportunistic compromises with the traditional Right, to the extent that on one occasion it banned the Communist Party after gaining power with its support. Eventually, the interests which it represented broke away to gravitate around those parties which were emerging as hegemonic in their respective fields: for example, the peripheral bourgeoisie and medium business groups inclined towards the traditional Right, while the lower sectors of the middle class were attracted, some to the Christian Democrats, some to the Left. By 1970, defections had reduced it to a residual party founded on bonds of urban and bureaucratic patronage.

MAPU was a splinter party that had broken away from the Christian Democrats. It dragged with it parts of the rural union infrastructure which the latter had created during its terms in office, but whose leadership was in the hands of a segment of the planning technocracy promoted by the Frei administration. In time these came to exhibit an exasperated nonconformity in face of the Party's concessions to the Right, and a sector of MAPU underwent a process of rapid and drastic radicalisation.

Finally, the fifth party which made up the UP was API (Independent Popular Action) which, in effect, was the electoral machine of Senator Rafael Tarud, whose support was made up of an assortment of localised interests from the Talca constituency which he represented in Congress, as well as from part of the Arab community who saw in API a means of social mobility.

How was it possible that such an apparently wide variety of sectors could constitute Popular Unity? In practice this description does not do justice to the relative importance of the various parties in the Front. The Communist and Socialist Parties gave UP its specific formula. The main body was made up of broad sections of the unionised working class, recently mobilised marginal urban sectors, elements of the peasantry, part of the radicalised new modernising technocracy, artists and intellectuals, and the lower middle class.[22] It was thus a relatively heterogeneous mass, united by a common denominator – the deep discontent caused by the failure of successive, preceding political models.

The decade of the 1930s had seen the crisis of Chile's traditional mining-export system and, as in other Latin-American countries, the first great wave of popular mobilisation: in 1932 a 'Socialist Republic' had even existed for twelve days. In the 1950s an accelerated process of urbanisation provoked the second great wave of popular mobilisation, generated by the crypto-fascist charisma of Carlos Ibañez. This culminated-when expectations were frustrated – in a spectacular rising of the urban lumpenproletariat in the Autumn of 1957 which was energetically suppressed. Finally, the 1960s witnessed the displacement of the axis of capital accumulation from the traditional industries (textiles, clothing, shoes,) where the lower and middle class predominated, towards dynamic industries (motor industry, electronics, petrochemicals) controlled by big national and foreign capital. It was this structural displacement of the production process which provoked the third great wave of popular mobilisation, introduced by the need to widen the industrial market and, as has been seen, was exploited politically by the Christian Democrats. The Chilean left was born as a result of the first wave, but did not control it – the Socialist Republic was merely a superficial phenomenon. The second wave found the Left in a remarkable state of ideological and organisational deficiency – the PC was outlawed and the PS collaborated with Ibañez. The third wave had a breadth unknown until then, affecting urban strata which previously had been excluded from every organised form of political participation. It was so extensive that it had two visible crests: in 1964, with the triumph of Frei, and in 1970, with that of Allende.

For the first time in its history, Chile entered an era of total participation. All the problems inherent in total participation in an oligarchic political system of previously restricted participation became visible. It turned out to be a 'penetrated political system'[23] – anomic in the sense that Bourricaud uses the term to describe a political system which is asystematic, fragmented into an unconnected plurality of 'political games',[24] with multiple rules of authority and legitimacy. Consequently, it was unable to invoke a national consensus, and was above all vulnerable to economic pressures and exposed to manipulation by the traditional elites.

The cleavages within the Popular Unity

The preceding account has established the context in which the political strategies of Popular Unity were developed. We say strategies in the plural, because the very day after Allende was elected, discussions began among the Chilean left about the nature of the

process which they were about to undertake. MIR has to be included in this analysis, though it did not form part of UP. We have constructed a dichotomy of positions, leaving aside shades of difference. For purely methodological reasons, we shall call one of these the radical position, and the other the moderate position.[25] The moderate position was shared by the Communists, sectors of the Socialists and MAPU, the Radicals and Allende himself. The radical position was held by MIR, sectors of the Socialists and of MAPU. During the UP government, MAPU divided into two factions. Moreover, the Christian Democratic left-wing again broke away, undergoing a process of rapid radicalisation that virtually carried it from one end of the political spectrum to the other, while API lost all political importance.

The left agreed that towards 1970 a severe crisis had arisen in the traditional system of domination. This crisis expressed itself in the confused process of popular mobilisation which characterised the final period of the DC government and the failure of its version of populism.

To moderates on the Left the system of domination had a specific centre of gravity. This consisted of imperialistic capital, the monopolistic bourgeoisie, and the landowners. Other sections of the bourgeoisie played a secondary role and had no access to the system of domination. This position did not imply uncritical acceptance of the by then outmoded distinction between a progressive national bourgeoisie and an exploitative imperialist bourgeoisie. It did not commit the moderates to sponsoring national autonomous capitalist development, but did stress that the core of the system of domination lay in the combined powers of a principal enemy – the imperialistic, monopolistic and land-owning bourgeoisies.

The radical position, heavily Frankian, agreed that the system of domination involved the imperialist classes but also argued that it embraced the entire body of native bourgeoisie – industrial, financial, and agrarian. This unity reflected the internationalization of the national bourgeoisie that had accompanied the growing penetration of the country by international monopoly capital. Secondly, contradiction might be expected to arise between the imperialist and native bourgeoisies over the shareout of surplus, but they were bound together in maintaining and consolidating the system of exploitation and domination.

The UP programme was vague. Only 2 of its 29 pages outlined the shape of the new economy. It was to comprise three sectors: the *state sector*, consisting of basic resources and enterprises controlled until then by foreign capital and the national monopolies; the *private sector* – the programme did not specify further; and the *mixed sector*, which was to combine private and state capital (again, it did not specify details.) The document was ambiguous, though given the circumstances it is questionable if it could have been otherwise. Of the famous 40 first measures, seven refer to norms of political and administrative integrity; five to reforms in the social-security system; ten to the first steps towards the construction of a welfare state (children's food and milk, student grants, cheap medicine); one to the control of alcoholism; five to the housing programme; one to the creation of the National Institute of Art and Culture; two to judicial reform; one to the disbanding of the Flying Squad of Carabineers; and eight to such orthodox economic matters as control of prices and inflation, severing of links with the International Monetary Fund, reduction of taxes affecting certain foodstuffs, abolition of resale tax, penalising speculation, and elimination of unemployment. The programme established its determination to push forward the agrarian reform process.

In reality it was a make-shift electoral document, reflecting the urgency of immediate mobilisation. The important thing was not so much the programme as the body of political and social forces which it mobilised, but the door remained open for future discrepancies. To the moderates the programme aimed to dislodge the dominant classes from power and initiate a revolutionary process of transition; to the radicals it expressed no more than the utopian visions of the petty bourgeoisie who had deluded themselves as to the possibility of modernising the capitalist system.

This discrepancy of attitude was reflected in a number of critical areas. For example, moderates stressed the need for a broad alliance to be formed with the middle strata – under working class leadership – in order for dependent monopoly capitalism to be destroyed. From the economic point of view, the elimination of the private monopolistic concentration and the dynamism of economic growth opened up favourable conditions for the lower and middle bourgeoisie, since one of UP's objectives was the rapid and permanent raising of production. Moreover, the new concentration of production and distribution around a dominant state sector and the need to increase the rhythm of economic growth made it necessary to maintain in operation a private sector of the economy, whose vastness and complexity could not be replaced overnight by socialised enterprises. From the political point of view alliance with the middle sectors would reinforce the working class and isolate the enemy. To the radicals, such an alliance of classes implied renouncing the commitment to push forward the socialist, anti-capitalist struggle of the proletariat. The organic incorporation of the lower bourgeoisie into the alliance would entail a policy of class cooperation and a consolidation of domination by the bourgeoisie.

With regard to the role of the state, Joan Garcés, speaking for the moderates, has distinguished between the form and content of the state.[26] The form historically assumed by the bourgeois state was liberal democracy, but, like every structure, it had a development which was partially autonomous and coherent as regards the legitimacy of authority. In reality, it was the content of society – that is, the socio-economic system – which defined the interest of the state. The obstacle encountered by the popular forces lay in the very structure of society, in its material bases, and not in the institutional superstructure. By virtue of the process unleashed by UP, the state would remain a structure of domination at the service of a class; but its class content would be modified by the development of the class struggle, initiating a phase in which the proletariat would acquire the indispensable elements to attain the rank of dominant class. Garcés condenses the role of the institutional structure into three points: as a means of access to political power for the revolutionary forces, as the stamp of legitimacy, and as the framework within which revolutionary action was to be exercised.

To the radicals, however, the liberal democratic state was the bourgeoisie's instrument of oppression, whatever institutional clothing it cloaked itself behind. Thus it was necessary to establish a popular, working-class power structure, organised autonomously and independently, in contra-position to the bourgeois state. It therefore became a question of organising an autonomous popular power structure as an alternative to the bourgeois state – not precisely to the government, since this was not necessarily identified with the state, and only opposed to the government to the extent that it was prepared to maintain the masses in a subordinate position with regard to bourgeois democracy.

Finally they disagreed over the role of the armed forces. To the moderates the armed forces were historically identified with *legitimate* governments, through the link of

institutional ideology and not of class. In order to replace this loyalty to the legitimate government – whose legitimacy was always bourgeois – by loyalty to the new revolutionary legitimacy, it was necessary to *socialise* the military institutions, integrating them into the socio-economic reality and infusing them with a national-progressive ideology. This strategy's chances of success depended on the survival of the government's legitimacy and on the attitude of the middle sectors with whom the armed forces felt ideologically identified. The radical position was that the idea of an alternative *popular power structure*, among other things, involved the creation of an autonomous popular military apparatus; that is, the construction of a parallel army. The alliance of the working class with the armed forces could not be institutional in character, but would have to be based on a popular revolutionary programme against exploitation by employers and imperialists.

Uneasy consensus or chaos?

UP's first political model was nurtured in the ferment of aspirations provoked by the Christian Democratic experiment and the displacement of the axis of capital accumulation towards the dynamic industries. The model was more or less the following: the improvement of the purchasing power of the urban and rural sectors by means of fiscal policy and state investment; improvement of the social-security system; and the formation of a vigorous state sector in the economy. It was hoped that the stimuli derived from a controlled inflationary process would permit an expansion of the industrial market and a reduction of the level of unemployment, by utilising the existing inactive potential. Politically, this meant favouring certain sectors of the lower and middle industrial and commercial bourgeoisie who would feel the first impact of the expansion of consumption (industries such as footwear, textile, furnishing, cosmetics, medicines), middle professional and technical sectors (lawyers, doctors, old and new bureaucracies), marginal urban sectors, and, of course, the industrial and semi-industrial working-class – especially the unionised sector – who would see their consumer capacity immediately increased. The model would then make it possible to isolate the principal enemy – national and foreign monopolies and the rural oligarchy – to deprive them of their base organisations, and to carry out at the same time the transformations considered necessary – such as agrarian reform, nationalisation of copper, and the creation of a dominant state sector in the economy based on strategic resources and monopolistic enterprises.

It was a coherent model, grounded in an accurate perception of the structure of domination in Chile, of its economic organisation, and of the level of political awareness among the mobilised sectors. Obviously, it corresponded to the moderate position; the radical sectors lacked an alternative model, because they did not even expect an electoral victory. Instead of a developed political model involving a set of coherent strategies and tactics on questions of the state, the armed forces, the role of the middle strata, forms of political mobilization and social organisation, and the regulation of production and distribution, they presented a series of fragmented political notions which failed to coalesce into a concrete political scheme. It seemed evident, therefore, that only the moderate project could be put into practice.

In fact, it worked. UP's first year created an impressive balance in its favour: substantial economic growth, a dramatic fall in the level of unemployment, the extension of agrarian reform, the nationalisation of copper, the beginning of the expropriation of the banks, control of an important series of national and foreign monopolies, and a more favourable income distribution. The middle sectors, suitably gratified, lent the government their support or their neutrality. The armed forces, secluded in the barracks, seemed

unwilling to heed any subversive suggestion that they should intervene, although this did not mean that there did not exist in their ranks an embryonic coup mechanism. Furthermore, the institutional structures served the new government's tasks with an unsuspected flexibility. Quantitatively, these facts are demonstrated by the results of the municipal elections held in April, 1972, which were overwhelmingly favourable to the government.

However, the paradox arose that, even though the middle sectors were being favoured, they lacked organic representation. Sectors of both the Popular Union and the Christian Democrats were opposed to the incorporation of the latter into the government. The sections supporting such participation were politically isolated. This proved to be an error, and inconsistent with the model that was being put into practice, because it meant that the middle strata received benefits without having to share the responsibilities which, in the long run, such a policy was to involve. Thus conditions were created in which the right wing Christian Democrats were not only excluded from positions of power, but were also able to accumulate forces and acquire preponderance to the detriment of UP, as the political situation deteriorated. Claudio Orrego expounded the situation with precision at the end of 1971, when he presented the Right's first opposition strategy under the suggestive inspiration of what he called 'the tactics of the Russian marshals'. The enemy should be allowed to penetrate into our territory, he said, and no matter how deep his advance, we should retreat without offering resistance; the 'Russian winter' would eventually set in, exhausting the enemy, and conditions would become ripe for his definitive defeat. The 'strategy of the Russian marshals' spelled out the situation: the enemy advance alluded to Popular Union's successes in the economic field; the advocacy of retreat meant that the DC should not join the alliance. Finally, the 'Russian winter' foreshadowed the difficulties which the government would have to face, having failed to broaden its political infra-structure by means of formal agreements with those who expressed the interests of the middle sectors and certain urban and rural marginal groups.

Indeed, the Russian winter did set in. By the middle of 1972 the model was already expended. It was no longer possible to count on the expansion of existing industrial capabilities. Moreover, the bourgeoisie enjoyed a large economic surplus consisting of uninvested profits, with which it embarked on wholesale hoarding and price speculation, giving rise to a black market. Moreover, income redistribution tended to accelerate inflationary pressures even further. The deterioration of the economic situation began to hit the life style of the middle sectors. Small business and industry and part of the middle bourgeoisie were an easy prey for speculative capital whose activities reached incredible dimensions. In spite of the policies of wage and salary readjustment, the bureaucracy, white-collar workers in the private sector, technicians and professionals were severely affected by the new turn of events. The Christian Democrats, the political expression of these sectors, openly joined the opposition, enabling it to build a broad mass movement. It made use of the professional associations, the trade guilds representing the interests of the lower and middle bourgeoisie, and its urban and rural union infrastructure. The Right's offensive strategy was already prepared and in October it was in a position to stage a dress rehearsal for the coup d'etat. Its tactical objectives were aimed at disputing every brick with which Popular Unity had built its political architecture: it was a question of creating a right-wing mass movement and of regaining for itself the myth of legitimacy. The policy of destabilisation advocated by Kissinger and the CIA found the ground well prepared.[27] The progressive sectors of the Christian Democrats found themselves definitively isolated, and henceforth they were to play virtually no further role.

Thus the first model foundered, a victim of the inconsistencies produced during its execution. The model had depended on a delicate articulation of its mechanisms. Though the model's economic policy – whose general lines were not called into question at the time by any of UP's members – had initially favoured the middle sectors, no political agreement had been reached with the entities who represented their interests. The anomaly of this situation is obvious if it is remembered that economic concessions are normally subordinated to politically negotiated agreements.

Faced by the nature of the right-wing offensive, Popular Unity, in October 1972 and again in June 1973, created two great mobilisations of the industrial, semi-industrial and artisan working-class, which were to deepen the conflict even further by eliminating – particularly after June 1973 – any possibility of reaching an understanding with the middle sectors. In this context, it should be borne in mind that only 18 per cent of the work force had been absorbed into the modern sector (monopolistic, imperialistic and defined by the programme as the principal enemy), while 25 per cent was employed in traditional or primitive activities (small and medium enterprises, pre-capitalist forms of production), that is, the sector which the government wished to attract or at least neutralise.

Did this mean that the alternative model of the radical sectors was going to be put into practice? No such model existed. The radical positions were made up of a set of political notions which failed to coalesce into a coherent, finished model. During the application of the first model a consensus had existed within UP. The radical and moderate sectors coexisted peacefully; the discrepancies emerged as one of the consequences of the crisis of the first model. Bitter internal debates began, while the right proceeded to dismantle, piece by piece, the political model which the former had succeeded in implementing. Popular Unity had been able to utilise in its favour the political mobilisation of vast sectors, isolating the rebellious factions. Now the Right, too, was to use the political mobilisation of the middle strata and urban and rural sectors, who increasingly came over to them as a result of the discontent caused by the economic situation.

On the Left debates began which reflected the old divisions. The dispute between the two philosophies paralysed Popular Unity strategically and tactically, divided its leadership and its cadres, and dissipated its energies in sterile arguments. The moderate sector, still clinging to the first model, which was more and more rapidly losing validity, was in favour of rectifying its defects by organically incorporating the Christian Democrats into the alliance. In the last moments it even seemed disposed towards a strategic retreat. The radical sector preached the need for a strategic regrouping, but was unable to project a coherent model embracing all the problems posed by the new political situation: increasing difficulties in the economic field, including an international financial blockade; the progressive shift of the middle classes towards fascist attitudes; disquieting movements in the ranks of the armed forces; the regain of control over a part of the marginal urban sectors, and part of the peasantry and industrial working-class by the Christian Democrats; serious acts of terrorism and economic sabotage; an offensive of institutional bodies against the legitimacy of the government; and other problems no less important if less notorious. But above all, the radical sectors were unable to carry out the key element of their strategy – armed popular power.

It is now a commonplace of the conventional wisdom of both the Chilean and non-Chilean left to attribute the failure of the Popular Unity experiment to the blind application of a revisionist, reformist or petit-bourgeois model. Our main thesis, on the contrary, is that

the coup d'etat of 1973 caught Popular Unity devoid of any political model, and devoid of the minimum capacity for political manoeuvre, either to advance, as the radical sector sought to do, or to consolidate, as the moderates wished. The cleavages among the left became so impregnated with resentment and distrust that they frustrated the alliance and prevented it from formulating and executing any operative political model, at the very moment when the right succeeded in surmounting its own divisions and closing ranks behind a united political project. In its last days, Popular Unity presented a graphic picture of an army beseiged by the enemy, exhausted by internal struggles, and under the command of a host of generals who were unable to agree among themselves, and whose orders were, in any case, notoriouly altered in the process of execution. It was a case not so much of pluralism, as of fragmentation; not of multi-models, but of chaos. It was in this state that Popular Unity was caught on 11th September 1973.

Postscript : what happened to the middle class?

If the Chilean middle class nursed dreams of a new chapter in the revolution of expectations, the military junta's rigid economic policies soon put an end to their illusions. The typical instruments of promotion and articulation of the interests of the middle sector have been severely affected by the government's measures. In the first place, the political parties which constituted the usual channels whereby sections of the middle class managed to articulate part of their interests and acquire a certain mobility of status, are legally in recess, if not dissolved. In the second place, the Chicago-style liberalism which has considerably reduced the role of the public sector in economic activities, has also radically affected the middle stratum's possibilities of expansion, which are closely dependent on the dynamism of state practices. Events such as the dismantling of state enterprises almost constitute an act of economic terrorism against the middle class, which, as a consequence, is undergoing a drastic process of depression, leaving it at the mercy of speculative and monopolistic capital. It is, after all, significant that it should have been the sale of a series of state enterprises which prompted Frei to voice his first open criticism of the military junta..

Flatly excluded from the source of capital accumulation, caught within a rigid system of social stratification based on the alliance of the military–bureaucratic oligarchy with big monopolistic and speculative capital, where every form of promotion and expansion of its interests has vanished, the destiny of the middle class is sombre and uncertain.

NOTES

1. We have employed the typology outlined by Gino Germani and Kalman Silvert in 'Estructura Social e Intervención Militar en America Latina,' published in *Argentina, Sociedad de Masas*, edited by Torcuato S. Di Tella and others, Edit. Eudeba, Buenos Aires, 1966.

2. Anibal Quijano, *Nacionalismo, Neoimperialismo y Militarismo en el Perú,* Ediciones Periferia S.R.L., Buenos Aires, 1971.

3. Prominent members of the Chilean armed forces have repeatedly stated that the vices of Chilean democracy, which culminated in the Marxist government of Allende, originated in the demagogic attitudes of the DC.

4. Luis Corvalán, *Informe al Pleno,* Austral, Chile, April 1969.

5. For an adequate understanding of the political role of the middle sectors see: James Petras, *Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development,* University of California Press, Berkeley, 1969; Enzo Faletto, Eduardo Ruiz and Hugo Zemelman, *Génesis Histórica del Proceso Politico Chileno,* Editoral Nacional Quimantu, Chile, 1972; Marcos Kaplan, *Formación del Estado Nacional en America Latina,* Edit. Universitaria, Chile, 1969; Fernando H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependencia y Desarrollo en America Latina,* Siglo XXI, Mexico, 1969; Hugo Fruhling, *La Clase Media en Chile,* Unpublished thesis, Facultad de Ciencias Juridicas y Sociales, Universidad de Chile, 1973. For methodological reasons we understand by middle sectors (strata, classes) primarily the following social groups: civil servants, white-collar workers in the private sector, professionals and technicians, craftsmen, small and medium businessmen, manufacturers and farmers. The concept thus embraces a heterogeneous complex of groups, but they are all closely dependent on urbanisation processes and governmental practices.

6. Our discussion of the middle classes is based on the text of Luis Ratinoff: 'Los nuevos grupos urbanos: las clases medias', in *Elites y Desarrollo en America Latina,* edited by S.M. Lipset and A.E. Solari, Edit Paidos, Buenos Aires, 1967.

7. For a theoretical understanding of the dichotomy mass party/cadre party, and related problems, see: Cliff and others, *Party and Class*, Pluto Press, London, 1970; and Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties*, Methuen and Co., Ltd., London, 1967.

8. On this point, see James Petras, *op. cit. passim.*

9. The concept of 'marginal urban sectors' refers to those sectors of the work-force which, permanently, and not just temporarily, have lost the possibility of becoming workers with a relatively stable paid occupation. The left showed a great lack of understanding of the role of these sectors, assimilating them into either the lumpenproleteriat or the industrial reserve army. See: José Nun, 'Superpoblación relativa, ejército industrial de reserva y masa marginal'; Miguel Murmis, 'Tipos de marginalidad y posición en el proceso productivo'; Ernesto Laclau, 'Modos de producción, sistemas económicos y población excedente: aproximación histórica a los casos argentino

y chileno', in *Revista Latinoamericana de Sociología*, Vol. V, No. 2, July 1969; also Anibal Quijano, 'The Marginal Role of the Economy and the Marginalised Labour Force, in *Economy and Society,* Vol. 3, 1974.

10. Norberto, Lechner, *La Democracia en Chile,* Ediciones Signos, Buenos Aires, 1970, pp. 117-117.

11. María Francisca Ide, 'La Democracia Cristiana en Chile', in *Foro Internacional,* Vol. X, No. 2, October – December 1979.

12. Quoted by Norberto Lechner, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

13. María Francisca Ide M., *op.cit.* This text successfully analyses the Christian-Democratic experiment.

14. Markos J. Mamalakis, 'The Theory of Sectoral clashes', *Latin American Research Review.* Vol. 4, No. 3, 1969.

15. 'Totalism' seems to be a typical feature of modern Latin-American political systems. Immobilism (or demobilisation), mobilisation and totalism' this is the sequence of the process, to judge from the experiences of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Chile. The traditional right plays the card to immobilism, but once mobilisation has been precipitated, it is obliged to have recourse to totalism by which determined institutional or associational groups akin to the hegemonic sectors of the right (such as the armed forces, sectors of Peronism or the Chilean DC) take over the state, unions, universities, clubs, the mass media, academic circles, in short, every organisation capable of being used to focus an mobilise opposition. According to Gino Germani, mobilisation is a psycho-sociological process whereby groups languishing in the passiveness corresponding to the standard traditional pattern (predominance of prescriptive action though behaviour according to internalised norms) acquire a certain capacity for deliberative behaviour, reach levels of aspirations different from those fixed by this pre-existent pattern, and consequently come to exercise activity in the political field. Mobilisation means, therefore, the passage from prescriptive action to elective action. G.Germani: *Politica y Sociedad en una Epoca de Transición*, Ed. Paidos, Buenos Aires, 1965, p. 150. For the history of political mobilisation in Chile see, Atilio A. Boron, 'Notas sobre las raices historico-estructuales de la movilización politica en Chile', *Foro Internacional,* Vol.XVI, No. 1, July-September 1975.

16. The peculiar thing about the Latin-American situation is that even populist projects, or certain capitalist projects, are incompatible with the present structure of power and the organisation of the state. Thus, when progressive theses maintain that, in Chile, the state is an expression of capitalist interests, this affirmation has to be corrected in the sense that the state guarantees a certain capitalism but is incompatible with others, i.e. a capitalism based on a self-sustaining process of industrialisation, untied to advanced economies, directed by the state, redistributive, concentrated on capital goods and modernising the agrarian structure. The introduction of this brand of capitalism would imply such a clash of sectoral interests that the whole structure of domination would threaten to collapse, resulting in a national-popular revolution. Hence the state represents a compromise of sectoral interest (without prejudice to some appearing as hegemonic) which prevents the development of other types of capitalism.

17. In practice, in Chile the processes of ideological formation, political mobilisation and popular organisation have been intimately linked to the electoral struggles. The electoral campaigns of 1964 and 1970 have a crucial importance in the advancement of popular political mobilisation. The passage from restricted democracy to democracy with total participation is, as this essay argues, the indispensable antecedent which made possible the mass struggle after 1970. In Chile, therefore, the electoral struggles were not mere tricks of the ruling power by which it permitted itself to be ritually contested in order to better consolidate itself, as Georges Balandier puts its, but were fundamental phases in the class struggle, on the level both of organisation and consiousness.

18. PS de Chile, *La Polémica Socialista-Comunista,* PLA, Santiago, 1962.

19. *Arauco,* No. 79, August 1966, p. 23, Santiago. The italics are ours.

20. *Arauco,* op.cit., p. 18.

21. George I. Blanksten. 'Political Groups in Latin-America', in *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries,* edited by John H. Kautsky, John Wiley and Sons Inc., U.S.A., 1967, pp. 146-147.

22. In our opinion, therefore, an objective class analysis refutes theses which claim to see in Popular Unity a 'radicalised movement of the lower middle-class.' Such interpretations usually have to have recourse to 'structural-functionalist' analyses which associate internal party 'bureaucracies' with 'deviant' conduct.

23. James N. Rosenau defines it as follows' 'a penetrated political system is one in which non-members of a national society participate directly and authoritavely through actions taken jointly with the society's members, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilisation of support on behalf of its goals,' in 'Pre-Theories and Theories in Foreign Policy', contained in *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy,* edited by the author, The Free Press, New York, 1971, p. 128.

24. Francois Bourricaud, 'Les Règles du Jeu en Situation d'Anomie: le Cas Peruvien', in *Sociologie du Travail,* No. 3, July-September 1967, p. 332.

25. These labels should not be taken to imply value judgement. They have been used because they have been consecrated by 'conventional wisdom', to which all research owes its 'pound of flesh'.

26. Joan Garcès, *El Estado y Los Problemas Tacticas en el Gobierno de Allende,* Siglo XXI Argentina editores S.A., 1973, pp. 74 and following.

27. See Church report on the activities of the CIA, United States Congress, 1975.

CHAPTER II

CLASS AND MASS IN THE CHILEAN SOCIALIST PARTY

by

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The problem of class is one of the most important aspects of a party's organisation. When the party is a mass party, as I hope to show the Chilean Socialist Party to be, the need for an analysis of 'class' is even more imperative. Gramsci, Luxemburg, Johnstone, Magri, Djilas, Rossands, and indeed Lenin, have stressed the point from a Marxist perspective.[1] The central issue has become the inescapability of the class problem as one of the most important factors causing a party to adopt a given pattern of organisation.

The issue of the party as a representative of given class interests is certainly related to the issue of the party as a true representative of a given social class. In other words, a party can in a variety of cases articulate social class interests and, consequently, the demands of that social class.

Blondel establishes a very close relationship between class structure and class-based parties, referring to the Socialist and Communist parties of Europe. He added that the size of industrial groups and the nature of society, 'account for variations in the size and importance of class-based parties of the socialist (and indeed Communist) types'.[2] He stated further that, 'class-based groups are somewhat peculiar in that their goals are generally opposed to those of the prevailing groups in society' and that 'where objective bases for large trade unions do not exist, class-based parties are unlikely to develop.' The first issue will be to identify the class character of the Chilean Socialist Party.

The Social Characteristics of the Party

The question of a party as the representative and means of articulation of a particular class interest does not explain in itself that party's structure. It is clear, at least in the case of the Chilean Socialist Party, that the class issue is linked to the party also being a *mass* organisation. Blondel rightly says in this respect that 'while one quickly had to recognise the short-comings in the Duverger theory of party, the distinction between mass parties and parties of 'cadres' appeared to correspond to modern realities. On the one hand, some parties are merely organisations of professional politicians, held together in order to fill elective posts; on the other, some parties bring within their fold hundreds of thousands of ordinary people who have no personal political aspirations but simply want to promote a cause and help others to gain political power.'[3]

Although the Leninist idea of a cadre party is not the same as Duverger's, both have in common the concept of the development of an elite group actively integrated one way or another into party affairs, either paid or not. This is in contrast with Luxemburg's model of the working class party – and egalitarian and necessarily non-selective quantity of people with more or less general political aims and without fixed, firmly established *a priori* strategies.[4]

The general idea of a cadre party includes the notion of a few people responsible for manipulating the affairs of other people, while the mass idea is indicative of a de-personalised political leadership in which the existence of a body of supporters linked by cohesive general political aims has to be taken into consideration. This is certainly so whether the cadre party is shaped along the Leninist lines of professional revolutionaries devoted entirely to the party or along the more liberal lines of professional politicians held together in order to gain political power on either ideological or purely practical terms.[5]

Duverger emphasized, however, that the difference between a mass and a cadre – or, as he calls it, committee – party should not be seen as merely related to the numbers of people involved: 'the distinction between cadre and mass parties is not based upon their dimensions, upon the number of their members: the difference involved is not one of size but of structure'.[6] It is the factor of class and mass membership and participation in the party's affairs which mainly determines party structures.

Once the character of the class membership and participation of the Chilean Socialist Party has been identified, the nature of its internal organiszation according to the two classical cadre or mass models can be described. Blondel's hypothetical assumptions about the mass party identify at least six patterns which I shall examine and analyse vis-à-vis the Chilean Socialist Party.

A party is a mass party if electors identify themselves with it, a matter reflecting the quality of support rather than its quantity. Mass parties are characterised by a high reliance on voluntary help, while parties of committees are essentially organized on the basis of a small nucleus of clients, paid or otherwise, dependent on the local leader. Mass parties assume the existence of permanent organisations, both at the national and local levels. The bureaucratization of the party structure is a consequence of the stability of the institution which, in turn, is characteristic of mass parties. Party oligarchies may develop in this way and some of the democratic features which appear to be associated with mass parties may diminish as a result. A nationally responsible leadership is also characteristic; leaders of parties of committees (or cadres) are responsible to representatives in the legislature or to small groups of leaders outside it. A reasonable access to the use of mass media is also typical. Finally, the relationship between party images and those of the leaders is an important element in mass parties.[7]

Although Blondel clearly establishes that his interpretation of mass parties reflects the social and political reality of industrial societies, he did not completely rule out the possibility that different types of societies – such as Chile, considered as underdeveloped or on the way to development – could also fit into this framework.

The feasibility of a mass class-based party in a pre-industrial society was foreseen by Blondel when he stated that, 'often [these parties are] chosen to be the means by which change is achieved.'[8] However, he considers that the natural development in pre-industrial societies is towards the party of committee, because 'mass parties require popular identification in pre-industrial societies.' The local notables are more present, more real, than the party; educational achievement is too limited and the impact of mass media too weak to lead to the natural development of a party identification. The groups and associations from which mass parties tend to emerge in modern industrial societies are non-existent or limited to rather isolated urban areas with which the bulk of the population has very few connections.'[9]

While accepting Blondel's arguments, I should point out that they do not amount to a contradiction of the existence of such a party in the Chilean context. Although Chile was, and indeed is, a society in development, large membership bases for trade unions have in fact existed for the last 30 or 40 years. The mining industry has contributed to a long tradition of trade unionism in the country. Also, at different times in the country's history, there have been what Blondel calls 'circumstances' which have enabled the working and middle classes to achieve some short-term common aspirations. These circumstances (the emergence of charismatic leaders and a process of decolonization) are not necessarily

perceived identically in all social and historical situations. In the case of the Chilean Socialists, if not a decolonization process, a development one undoubtedly brought together parties that traditionally articulated the interests of the middle classes (the Radical party) and parties that traditionally represented the interests of the working class (the Socialists and Communists). At other stages, a 'de-Americanisation' process provided what amounted to the legitimization of the party within the Chilean political system, and helped to firmly establish the organization as a mass party.

Industrialization in Chile during the last 30 or 40 years has indeed created the conditions for this mass party. The development of trade unions, peasants co-operatives, professional and intellectual associations helped to develop the party from at least the latter part of the 19th century.[10]

The class composition of the organization

Is the Chilean Socialist Party a class-based party? What has been the development of the party in this respect since its foundation in the early 1930s up to the 1970s? First, let me analyse the social composition of the party's membership during the three different stages which have characterized the party's development.

During the first stage, from the founding of the party in 1933 to the party's role in the Popular Front (in 1939), the membership was 55 per cent working class and 45 per cent middle class. The second stage, covering the party's governmental duties (1939-1953), shows a distinct increase in the party's working class membership, as middle class representation declined. The average type of membership for this stage was 65 per cent working class and 35 per cent middle class. During the third and final period (1953-1970), the party, without any responsibilities in government (apart from those arising from its role as opposition), showed a further increase in working class representation (70 per cent) and a commensurate decline in middle class representation (30 per cent). The party emerged in the 1930s as an almost pluralist, multi-class body. The passage of time, however, saw a decline in middle class participation and a consolidation of working class hegemony within the party. The data available suggest that this was mostly due to an increase of working class membership, while middle class membership declined.

It has not been possible to establish the rate of people leaving the party during any period of its history. This sort of information is rarely known to responsible officials, and if it is, they do not make it public. Generally, however, reliable party officials think the change in class representation was due to a shift in the role of the party as articulator of demands. These figures can be contrasted with those for the leadership where the predominance of the middle class over the working class is clear. A study of the central and regional committees at all three stages illustrates the point (Table 1).

TABLE 1

Class membership of higher committees[11]

1930-1938	Working Class	25 per cent
	Middle Class	75 per cent
1939-1953	Working Class	45 per cent
	Middle Class	55 per cent
1953-1970	Working Class	48 per cent
	Middle Class	50 per cent
	Bourgeoisie	2 per cent

It is clear that working class representation in membership began only with a slightly higher percentage than middle class representation – (55 per cent against 45 per cent), a characteristic that marked most of the first ten years of the party's development. During the same period, however, working class representation in the leadership reached only 25 per cent against 75 per cent for middle class representation. This seems to indicate that although the party effectively began as a vehicle for the working class, the representation of the then embryonic Chilean middle class was considerable. Later, however, middle class representation diminished significantly.

Both the working and middle classes supported the creation of a new progressive, anti-establishment party – such as the Chilean Socialist Party, as a direct result of the inability, and probably the unwillingness, of existing political parties to successfully meet the increasing needs arising from industrial development in Chile. The rate of annual growth of the gross aggregate value of industry in Chile indicates that in a variety of sectors, industrial growth underwent an expansion that in social and political terms meant a continued increase in labour power and consequently in social and political demands. Sectors such as textile, clothing, wood, paper, chemical, mining and metals experienced remarkable rates of growth, well above what have been considered normal rates.

Although industry progressed, this was not the case with average earnings. In social terms, therefore, this development was regressive (Table 2). During 1914-15-16, the average net income of the Chilean worker was 30.4 *escudos;* this went down to 29.2 *escudos* for 1922-23-24 and to 26.9 for 1938-39-40. Only later was this trend reversed, probably as a result of the Popular Front and subsequent centre-left governments that followed (18.8 *escudos* for 1944-45-46 and 32.3 *escudos* for 1951-52-53). The need for a political party that could articulate the political demands arising from the opposing pressures of industrial growth and a demand for social justice were strongly felt even in the 1920s and 1930s, when a violent drop by 30.4 to 29.2 *escudos* (1922-23-24) and 26.9 *escudos* (1938-39-40) in the average net income (in Chilean *escudos*) took place.

Although the development of the Chilean Socialist Party was a response to this need for working class representation, the initial pressures for the party's foundation came from

TABLE 2

Average net income for workers in Chile
(calculated in terms of real value of *escudos* in 1950)[12]

	1914-15-16	1922-23-24	1938-39-40	1944-45-46	1951-52-53	1957-	1960-61
Foods	32.3	32.0	25.6	27.4	30.7	29.1	36.1
Beverages	28.2	33.3	21.9	22.9	34.9	29.7	36.4
Tobaccos	20.1	23.5	22.7	31.7	50.3	39.8	20.3
Textiles	39.4	33.1	34.1	34.5	35.3	28.7	40.7
Clothing and Shoes	35.8	31.0	25.8	27.5	22.1	22.9	24.4
Woods	33.5	26.7	34.2	26.7	22.4	13.9	19.1
Papers	26.4	18.5	28.4	35.0	38.0	32.2	50.2
Leathers	27.3	26.8	24.7	25.5	26.4	22.8	29.1
Chemicals	12.7	12.1	16.2	24.9	34.6	24.0	42.5
Non-metallic minerals	29.3	17.9	10.6	23.0	26.9	25.2	29.5
Metallurgy	27.5	40.3	26.6	30.6	42.7	28.4	32.8
TOTAL	30.4	29.2	26.9	28.8	32.3	26.2	24.0

other groups. For most of the 1930s working class representation in the leadership was rather low. The reasons for this are not entirely clear, but there are at least two factors that might help us to understand the phenomenon. The level of both formal and political education among working class leaders was significantly lower than that of middle class leaders during the 1930s. This could only change once the process of rapid expansion in education took place during the radical governments from 1938 on. These governments, headed by Pedro Aguirre Cerda, Juan Antonio Ríos and Gabriel Gonzalez Videla from 1938 to 1952, enabled low income people to attend both primary and secondary schools, thus increasing the possibility of social mobility.[13] Moreover, the level of political information among working class people was, as a natural consequence of poor education, lower than that of the middle class. This was reflected in the intensity and quality of middle class participation in cultural associations in Chile during the decade 1930 to 1940, and the weakness of working class participation during the same period in the same type of organizations.[14]

The tendency, then, for working class people to be involuntarily isolated from cultural and political developments in the country was naturally more acute in the case of developments abroad. Thus, international tensions arising from the success of the Soviet revolution in Russia and the development of social and economic crises in Europe as a result of the world depression, affected working class people in Chile in practical terms, but not intellectually, as it undoubtedly did the middle class. Leadership of protest movements was provided by intellectuals and professionals, though the rank and file were recruited mainly from the working class. In other words, conditions in Chile were right for creating a new working class party, but were not right for producing a working class leadership: one class provided the followers, the other provided the leadership. Examination of the second period reveals that working class membership increased by 10 per cent (from 55 per cent during 1930-39 to 65 per cent from 1939 to 1953), while middle class representation decreased by the same amount from 45 per cent to 35 per cent. Leadership figures show that working class representation went up from 25 per cent to 45 per cent, while middle class representation went down from 75 to 55 per cent in the same period.

The reasons for these developments are, of course, related to the factors which help to explain the opposite course of events during the first period. In the period that began in the late 1930s Chile experienced the effects of growth in education and industry under the direction of the Ministry of Education and the Corporación de Fomento de la Producción (CORFO), founded by Aguirre Cerda's administration.[15] This opened the door for an increased working class representation in both membership and leadership of the Socialist party.

The third period revealed a consolidation of working class representation in the membership (70 per cent), and a deterioration of middle class participation (30 per cent), compared to 65 and 35 per cent, respectively, for the previous period. But for the first time leadership representation showed an increase in middle class representation (from 45 to 48 per cent). Also, the figures indicate the existence of a small group of bourgeois leaders (2 per cent; mainly industrialists and merchants), a sector that hitherto had been conspicuously absent.

An explanation for this trend in the social make-up of the leaders during this final period is difficult to establish. One could, however, point to the increasing participation of students in politics, both at secondary and university levels. This phenomenon, which has since characterised Chilean political life, acquired a consistency during the second Ibañez Administration. It is not clear whether students participated more actively in politics than

before, but a numerical increase was without doubt due to the expansion of university education throughout the country. During the 1950s, no less than four Provincial *Sedes* (headquarters) were established by the University of Chile alone. The figure went up to eight in the next decade. During the 1960-1970 period, the National Technical University also developed regional centres in the North and the South of the country, transforming medium level technical training centres in departments of higher education (notably in Engineering, Metallurgy, Biochemistry and Building), amounting to a total of seven new institutions. The Catholic University followed the same pattern, establishing no less than six high level centres between 1950 and 1970.[16]

The distribution of centres of higher education throughout the country was a relatively new phenomenon in Chile, and its beginning can be traced to the early 1950s. It obviously dispersed the students. Thus, a purely *santiaguino* phenomenon (that is, people living in the capital city of Santiago), was transformed into a national phenomenon. Political life that in the provinces had been confined, in the case of students, to secondary pupils, came to be shared by university students and lecturers from the new, expanding higher education centres.

These developments helped increase political activity in the provinces both in quality and quantity. In the case of the Socialist Party, Regional and Section Committees were penetrated by university students and lecturers, who began to participate in politics from 1950 onwards. Their participation in leadership responsibilities was certainly among the functions performed by them, and their contribution at these levels was highly valued.

As 90 per cent of university students in Chile during 1950-1970 were of middle class origin, their importance in the internal political life of Chilean parties should be noted.[17] In addition to this, 70 per cent of the Student Unions in the provinces during this period were controlled by the left (Communists, Socialists and MIR, either separately or together). The appearance of a new social stratum, the bourgeoisie, representing 2 per cent of the *leadership* during this period, is also rather surprising, for this stratum had never previously had any representation in party life. An explanation of their presence at this stage can only be speculative. There might have been a need for the party to include the very small number of rich people who for one reason or another had come to join the organisation. Perhaps special personal qualities of these leaders might also have been a factor.

From the point of view of its social composition the party had clearly been a working class party. In its policies it had also articulated, in a reasonable way, the demands reflecting working class interests. The same trend could be observed in the party's main ideological stance. Middle class representation in the party's leadership does not, however, prevent the party from being considered a class-based party, representing the interests of a particular class. Futhermore, the party satisfies Blondel's two main assumptions for class based parties – and the existence of an objective base for trade-union development.[18]

The Chilean Socialist Party as a Class Party

To determine the extent of antagonism between what could be considered society's goals and the party goals, I isolated some fundamental issues included in the Chilean Constitution of 1925. These issues provided the base for the country's social, political and economic system until the government of President Salvador Allende was overthrown in 1973. They reflected the main characteristics of a liberal-democratic, Western type of system. The selected issues were then compared with fundamental issues included in official party documents from 1933 up to 1970 (Table 3).

TABLE 3
Constitutional and Socialist Party goals and principles

Constitutional goals	Party goals
'All inhabitants of the Republic are assured equality before the law . . . in Chile there are no class privileges.'	'In Chile there are two classes: one exploits the other. One works and produces, and the other just exploits the other and gets the surplus value. The only system that can guarantee equality is the socialist system, as there is no possible equality in the present system.'
'All inhabitants of the Republic are assured of . . . the inviolability of all properties, without any discrimination . . nobody's property can be expropriated without specific law or a decision of the Judiciary . . .'	'Private property should always be limited by social interest. There should be ways available to publicly acquire all private properties belonging to individuals or corporations.'
'The conditions for making any private property public are that there should exist clear reasons of public interest; this public interest should be declared by law. An indemnization should be adjudicated to the owner and paid in advance.'	'An extended area of public ownership is the only guarantee that a just redistribution of income is going to be undertaken . . . the legal means to enable this are inadequate and reactionary and tend to perpetuate an intolerable situation . . .' 'No indemnization should be given for those expropriated properties that already receive excessive benefits . . . this is certainly the case of the copper companies . . .'
'No industry can be prohibited unless it is contrary to the security of the country, health of the public or normal accepted social uses . . .'	'The development of private industry and commerce should be limited very clearly by the public interest.'
'No authority, person or group of persons can, under any circumstances, exercise powers other than those which have been given to them by the law.'	'All the power should go to the People's Assembly and the artificial and hypocritical 'division of powers' should be brought to an end immediately.'
'The President will be chosen by direct suffrage by the citizens who can legally exercise that right . . .'	'A People's Assembly should be entitled to reform the current presidential, autocratic system, and replace it by one in which all responsible leadership is exercised collectively.'
'All inhabitants of the Republic are assigned . . . freedom of education . . .'	'All so-called 'individual rights' should be limited in accordance to collective needs. The so-called 'freedom of education' is a pretext for an education for the rich and an education for the poor.'

Examination of Table 3 shows that there has been almost complete antagonism between what has been considered as society's goals and those considered party goals. This satisfies Blondel's assumption for class-based parties. However, some of the issues I compared require further explanation.

It is clear that with respect to the division of powers and of Presidential power within this, that there is a wider discrepancy between Socialist Party goals and those of the constitution. Equally, in the economic field total contradiction emerges. In the area of freedoms and rights, however, the situation is less clear, for although the Socialist party has stressed the need to increase freedoms in a wide sense, this stand should be understood from a Marxist perspective. This is no doubt different from, if not in opposition to, liberal interpretations of the constitution. In the case of education the Socialists have consistently opposed (at least theoretically) private education and have always supported state education. With respect to other freedoms mentioned in the 1925 Chilean Constitution, the party has never had a clear position, but its overall behaviour suggests that it has understood them to be within the general framework of a socialist, centralised, power-concentrated society. The same is also true of the concept of equality which from the Marxist and, I might add, Leninist perspective, differs of course from the liberal orientation. Freedom and equality appear as limitations on the individual in favour of collective responsibility and power-sharing. They do not talk of the full exercise of individual rights, considered independently or in opposition to the state, as is the case in liberal oriented positions.

The second of Blondel's assumptions for the development of class-based parties refers to the existence of 'objective' bases for trade union development. Table 4 includes only legal trade unions, which for most of the period did not cover unions with less than 25 members (in the case of the *sindicatos industriales* – industrial trade unions) and is consequently a low estimate. The table also excludes the majority of *sindicatos agricolas* (rural trade unions), which had to include at least 20 members to be declared legal. Only a sixth of all farms could fulfill that requirement when the 1947 law on rural trade unions was enacted. Before, provisions were even worse, but they improved with new legislation introduced in 1967.

TABLE 4

Growth of union membership in Chile, 1932-1969[20]

Year	*Plant*	*Craft*	*Rural*	*Total*
1932	29,400	25,400	–	54,800
1942	122,400	71,600	–	193,000
1952	155,000	128,300	1,000	284,300
1964	143,000	125,900	1,700	270,600
1969	196,100	233,000	104,700	533,800

My concern here, however, is not so much to analyse the quality and extent of the Chilean trade union movement, but to stress the fact that there was sufficient industrial and labour infrastructure to enable the fast and efficient development of unions.

The Chilean Socialist Party as a Mass Party

The fact that the party is class-based is related to it being also of a *mass type*. 'It remains to be seen whether mass parties are likely to develop in non-industrial societies,' says Blondel, after identifying the existence of this type of party in industrial societies. He considers that these parties develop in industrial societies, and in fact prove functional

for a variety of reasons – size and quality of industry and trade unions, sophistication of and extension of education, and the existence of highly specialised propaganda machines. The characterization of party as a mass organization, on the other hand, means from the structural point of view, that its character would undoubtedly influence the bureaucratic apparatus and the entire organizational structure.

The six main features of the mass party which Blondel developed, can be identified in the Chilean Socialist Party. Furthermore, Blondel's assertion that 'certain conditions are more likely than others to permit a successful imposition of a mass party in a pre-industrial society,' seemed to be appropriate in the case of the Chilean Socialists. 'Mass parties are also helped by the emergence of charismatic leaders; and the struggle for decolonization, particularly where it was difficult, established more firmly the position of these leaders,' he adds. 'But these mass parties remain somewhat different from the mass parties of modern industrial societies because they are imposed on a social system which is not really suited for them. Identification with the party has constantly to be fostered – and one of the ways by which it is fostered is by relying either on the nationalistic past or on the identity between leader and party.' All these patterns, as will be seen below, could also be observed to some extent in the Chilean Socialist Party.[21]

Blondel goes on to say that with gradual industrialization groups such as trade unions will come to have a greater impact on the population; political life in the large cities will acquire some of the characteristics of mass party politics, but this comes rather slowly and, in the large cities, modified parties of committees are likely to develop.

On the whole, this is what has happened with the Chilean Socialist Party. A mass, class-based party, consistently acquired and developed habits normally associated with the committee party. Although a final analysis should regard the party as having a mass type character, some distinct, and without doubt deviant patterns must not be overlooked. There are three aspects of the party which I shall examine in the light of Blondel's ideas: the character of the party as a cadre or a mass party; the deficiencies in organisation arising from the differences between the ideology adopted by the party and its daily operation as a practical political unit; and the widespread aspiration in the party leadership to overcome the problems of party bureaucracy.

The mass and cadre models of party

It is difficult to attempt a thorough-going definition of mass and cadre party, and I do not intend to make it here. Nor do I wish to discuss the feasibility of both terms. Their present usage seemed quite appropriate in this case because they lead my research into a more detailed analysis of the party organization.

It is clear that the typology regards *membership* as one of the most important, if not the most important, element. From there on, the whole party apparatus can be broken down into component parts and analysed: the extent and quality of its bureaucracy, the way in which it works, how resolutions are adopted, the degree of participation in decision-making, and the forming of oligarchies.

On the whole, it can be said that a mass party is a political structure whose membership is characterized by its impersonality, while the cadre party stresses the importance of the individual as such. Mass parties count on widespread support of people, either on a direct (as individuals) or an indirect (as members of trade unions or other

associations) basis. Cadre parties rely exclusively on individual support, and elements such as prestige, fortune and other factors play an important role. Mass parties theoretically rely on a constant and systematic cash flow from party members, while cadre parties depend on money collected from rich contributors who are either the members of or are in sympathy with the aims of the party.

The list of differences could go on indefinitely, creating a dichotomy that does not always correspond to reality, as some parties have features of both mass and cadre parties. As this has been certainly the case of the Chilean Socialist Party, I prefer to tackle the problem of the mass or cadre organisation using Blondel's six hypothetical assumptions of the mass party. This reveals the extent to which the party structure satisfies these requirements.

The first assumption is that a party is a mass party if electors identify with it by providing stable electoral support. In the case of the mass parties, 'the electors will continue to vote for their party, whether their current representative chooses to be loyal or disloyal', while generally in the case of parties of committees, 'the elector tends to follow the man if the man changed party.'

The Chilean Socialist Party exhibits a definite tendency towards spatial stability. There have been five electoral zones in which the party has always been strong – the North, including Tarapaca, Antofagasta and Coquimbo provinces; the Centre, mainly Santiago and Valparaiso; Arauco and Concepción; and Magallanes. The Lake zones (mainly Cautín and Valdivia provinces) have also shown a relatively high degree of electoral support for the Socialists, though the trend here has been weaker (Table 5).

Zone 1 is dominated by mining and contains 60 per cent of the country's mining population. Zone 2 is predominantly industrial and contains 70 per cent of all industrial workers. Zone 3 is both mining and industrial in economic activity, whilst Zones 4 and 5 are both agricultural and industrial. Thus, there is no place where industry or mining is important where the Socialist Party does not have strong and persistent electoral support. Nevertheless, though industrial workers and miners seem to have been the main source of support, middle class support exists, especially in Zone 2, where bureaucratic activity is concentrated. Conversely, in the predominantly agricultural provinces (Colchagua, Curicó, Talca, Maule, Linares and Ñuble) support has been inconsistent.

There has been some consistency in national support for the Socialist Party for the same period (Table 6). Their percentage of the vote was never lower than around 10 per cent and never higher than around 14 per cent. The lowest vote came in 1949, when the three factions into which the party was then divided received a total of 9.3 per cent. The highest percentage polled was 14.1 per cent in 1953 (counting the vote of both the Partido Socialista de Chile and the Partido Socialista Popular), a fact that can be attributed to the popularity of the Ibañez administration, in which the Partido Socialista Popular played an important role. The Socialist party thus fulfills the criterion of electoral stability.

The second assumption argues that while parties of committees are essentially organized on the basis of small nuclei of clients paid or otherwise dependent on the local leader, mass parties 'are characterised by a high reliance on voluntary help, both in kind and cash.' The Chilean Socialist Party has certainly been dependent almost entirely on voluntary work by its members, and paid functionaries have been absent for most of the party's history. Furthermore, the finance system has been based, at least in theory, upon fixed contributions from members.[22]

TABLE 5
Distribution of Socialist Party deputies, 1937-69.
By zone and province

Zone	*Province*	*1937*	*1941*	*1945*	*1949*	*1953*	*1957*	*1961*	*1965*	*1969*
1	Tarapaca	1				1	1	1		
	Antofagasta	1	1		1	2	1		1	1
	Atacama					1				
	Coquimbo	1	1	1	1	2		1		
2	Aconcagua							1		
	Valparaíso	3	2		1	2	1	1	1	1
	Santiago 1	3	3	2	2	2		1		1
	2	1	1	1		1	1		1	1
	3	1	1		1	1	1		1	1
	4		1		1	1			1	1
	O'Higgins	1	1		1				1	1
	Colchagua		1						1	1
	Curicó					1		1		
	Talca					1				
	Maule									
	Linares							1		
	Ñuble 1				1	1	1			
	2									
3	Concepción	2			1	2	1	1	1	1
	Arauco							1	1	1
	Bío-Bío					1	1			
	Malleco					1	1			
4	Cautín	1	1			1	1	1		
	Valdivia	1	1					1	1	1
	Osorno							1	1	1
	Llanquihue					1				
	Chiloe					1				
5	Magallanes	1	1	1	1	1	1			

TABLE 6
Continuity of national support for the Socialist Party

Year of Election	1937	41	45	49	53	57	61	65	69
Percentage of Total Votes Cast	11.2	16.2	12.8	9.3	14.1	10.7	10.7	10.3	13.3
Deputy's Seats Obtained	17	15	5	11	24	11	12	15	15

The absence of paid officials is related to the voluntary help in kind and in cash on which the party could rely. The class of professional revolutionaries which Duverger envisaged in extremely centralized mass parties could not develop, therefore, in the Chilean Socialist Party. Moreover, the Leninist idea of full time revolutionaries whose lives should be entirely dedicated to the party could not exist because of the internal mode of organization and because the existing financial system would prevent it.

The third assumption concerns the question of oligarchy in leadership. Here the argument is that the institutional stability inherent in mass parties carries with it a tendency towards bureaucratization at all levels and towards a specific rigidity in the composition of the national leadership. This is difficult to investigate empirically,[23] but information available on the composition of the Central Committee at various periods suggests that oligarchic tendencies – whilst inevitably present – have also been accompanied by considerable turnover. In the period 1933-39, of a total of seventy-eight members of six separately constituted committees, only three had been re-appointed every year, while thirty-six had been re-appointed only once. For the period 1941-53, of eight committees comprising one hundred and forty-eight members, only five had been re-appointed throughout. Fifty-one members had only been re-appointed once. A similar pattern obtained up to 1969 and seems to have continued into the Allende period, when the level of mobility at the leadership level was considerable (Table 7).

TABLE 7
Re-appointment in the Central Committee, January 1971

Times Re-appointed	*Members*
1	36
2	7
3	2
4	1
5	1
6	1

The fourth characteristic of mass parties identified by Blondel is national responsible leadership. In the Chilean case the leadership was responsible not to its parliamentary deputies, nor to groups of party chiefs, but to the whole party. As with most mass parties, the Chilean Socialist party leadership needed to identify themselves and respond to the mass of electors and supporters whom the leaders wished to attract to the party, or to retain in it. The highest bureaucratic party structure, the Central Committee, and also its delegated body, the Political Commission, were both national organs responsible to the party as represented by the Congresses. These, in turn, were composed of delegates representing all internal bodies, from the bottom of the party organization (núcleos) up to those at the top, including both the acting Central Committee and Political Commission.

The Chilean Socialist Party has certainly always had the structure of a permanent organization. The bureaucratic structure at both the national and the local levels were designed to work on a day-to-day basis, though most of the leaders operated as part-time officials and without any financial reward. The financing system has not, in fact, been the same throughout the party's history. Initially, financing was based upon equal fees paid by the members. This method originated in the party's first years and continued until the mid-1950s, when a system of proportional fees was instituted. The proportional system was maintained up to 1970, when a progressive system of dues was drawn up and carried through by the leadership.

None of the three systems actually worked well, thus confirming Christian Anglade's contention that financing by membership contributions is unsatisfactory in almost all the cases studied by him in Latin America. He says that 'it does not seem that financing by membership contribution is satisfactory anywhere,' and he gives the example of *Acción Democrática* of Venezuela, a party that tried hard to 'impose compulsory levies on public servants who are party members, but has met the same difficulties as have traditional parties like the Colombian Liberal party.'[24]

A voluntary financing system was first established in the Chilean Socialist Party in 1934, but it did not last long. It was based on the assumption that every member had a sense of duty that would compel him to pay fees voluntarily according to his income. Compulsion was then not contemplated. In fact, a memorandum dated December 13, 1934, reminded members that fees were voluntary and that 'each member should pay according to his personal financial situation.'[25]

Apparently the system did not serve the party adequately, and a compulsory system of finance was established. This was enacted in 1935 and was based on the principle of 'equal fees', independent of the member's income. The fees were to be paid monthly to the nearest local party treasurer and fines were also instituted for those who failed, without explanation, to pay for more than three months.[26] The system was based on the principle of fees proportional to incomes, on a fixed scale. Everyone in the party would pay the same proportion but not the same amount, a concept that was certainly not in line with modern developments in taxation.[27] In 1970 the party drew up a system that was never actually put into extensive practice. It was based on the principle of higher incomes paying higher proportions, and lower incomes lower proportions. These went from a low level of 0.5 per cent to a high level of 20 per cent of net income.[28]

The money raised by all three systems never satisfied even the most modest of party needs. This caused anguish among the leaders and officials and reluctance of members to accept the posts of treasurer at the different party levels.[29] Reliable party figures establish that an average of not more than 10 per cent of all the money raised came from the three systems of members' subscription.

How did the party manage to survive? There was the problem of the bureaucratic apparatus, that, though very small and essentially part-time, had a permanent and a national status. There was also the problem of elections (municipal, parliamentary and presidential) which put the party in very difficult financial situations every two years – without taking into consideration by-elections. The only exception was the period of three years in which the party shared governmental responsibility with the Communist and Radical parties from 1970 to 1973. It is likely that the party then began to acquire the character of an organization Anglade calls 'parties with some degree of financial autonomy,' but no evidence on this could be gathered.

If the party was, for most of its history, an organization without financial autonomy, how was it able to survive? This was not a party whose only need for finance was immediately prior to elections, though at election times spending would increase significantly. But besides elections, the party had to cope with the financial burden arising from a variety of commitments.

The first was to maintain the party machine. Though the apparatus was part-time it was also permanent and national in scope. Paid clerical workers were needed in each of the

regions, though officials with political responsibilities were unpaid. The party also had to operate buildings, provide for the political education of its members, and pay for public relations and election expenditure.

Since no more than ten per cent of the party's spending was financed by members' dues – in contradiction with written regulations – how did the party manage to survive as a national, permanent organization for almost forty years? How did it manage to maintain national and regional headquarters; clerical officers; propaganda before, during and after election periods; media which were essentially non-profit making; and, at least during the period 1960-1970, permanent, well-staffed schools for political education?

There are no official records which can provide reliable data on this matter. There is unanimity, however, among both former and present leaders interviewed as to the manner in which the party filled the gap – donations from well-to-do sympathisers and members.[30] This included compulsory levies on the party's members of Parliament. These, however, did not always achieve complete success, as many of them tended to retain this levy to meet personal political costs arising from their parliamentary work, such as visits to their constituencies, banquets, local propaganda, gifts to important supporters.

The fact that 90 per cent of the party's expenses were covered by donations from wealthy sympathisers and/or members, raises questions about the extent of these people's influence on the party's policies. It is almost impossible to determine this. However, the recollections of reliable old party members allowed me to delineate certain characteristics of members and sympathisers who supported the party's finances. During the first ten or fifteen years of development, the party relied heavily on voluntary donations from sympathetic industrialists and important merchants. The proportion of party funds coming from this sector amounted to almost 80 per cent, while the rest came mainly from donations given on a month-to-month basis by medium and small merchants, resident mainly in the provinces. During the second 20 or 30 years, the party's finances began slowly to diversify, moving towards a different source – the international bureaucracy. Santiago was regional headquarters of a number of United Nations' technical bodies. A host of international conferences as well as a proliferation of highly placed, well-paid officials followed. It is reported that from the mid-1950s, the Socialist Party received important contributions from a significant number of sympathizers in international organizations. These sympathizers, both Chilean and non-Chilean, were even able to donate in foreign currency – mostly American dollars. The high exchange rate on the Chilean black market would allow considerable increases to be made on the initial contribution. It is not known how many officials contributed nor the amounts given, but it is certain that their support amounted to about half of party funds received from wealthy members and sympathizers, during the period 1952-1960. The last ten years of the party's history (1960-1970) registered an increase in contributions from the international bureaucracy, up to 60 per cent of the total income coming from wealthy sympathizers and members.[31]

The existence, then, of a permanent organization was only possible because of the existence of a network of wealthy contributors, some of whom were not members of the party. The rank-and-file contributions amounted to no more than an average of ten per cent, and the party could well do without them.

The fifth assumption concerns the need which mass parties have for the mass media. It is clear that mass parties, based on popular support, cannot, except in the very peculiar cases of a narrowly circumscribed geographical minority, develop and be maintained

without access to the press, radio and television. Both the requirements of identification and that of responsible leadership are dependent on mass-media utilization.

There is evidence to suggest that this has been the case in the Chilean Socialist Party, mainly in the last 20 years. Television developed in Chile only in the 1960s, but the Chilean Socialist Party did manage to make comprehensive use of the available mass-media before, during and after TV appeared on a national scale.

There are no official records, but reliable party officials revealed that between 1960-70 the party owned forty-two radio stations distributed throughout the country and covering all 25 provinces. This network included four stations able to reach the entire country on medium and short wave, and 38 regional stations covering certain geographical zones and also able to link themselves, when needed, to the four most powerful broadcasting networks.

It also owned eight regional daily newspapers, covering 70 per cent of the country. In addition to this, the party had a strong influence on the Santiago evening daily newspaper *Ultima Hora*, whose publication began in the mid-1940s and continued, with interruptions, up to the overthrow of President Allende's government in September 1973.[32] *Ultima Hora* was sold in three major Chilean cities (Santiago, Valparaíso and Concepción) and also in the surrounding towns and villages. In the mid-1960s its daily circulation of 80,000 was good by Chilean standards. Although it was not nationally distributed, it was widely considered as an influential newspaper whose opinions were valued by people holding power and by those generally considered in important positions in society – politicians, trade union officials, educational leaders, civil servants, businessmen, and church leaders. The Socialist party's opinions on national and international issues were normally printed in *Ultima Hora*, and its editorial comments usually reflected the party's position on certain issues. Moreover, the party also owned no less than two nationally distributed weeklies, with a collective circulation that oscillated between 3,000 and 30,000.

Finally, though there were no private TV networks in Chile, it is generally acknowledged that the left, and more specifically the Chilean Socialist and Communist parties, were always able to create, maintain and expand their influence on television from its origin under State and University controlled networks in the late 1950s and early 1960s. During the latter half of the 1960s, unofficial records estimate that approximately 70 per cent of the journalists working on both the National TV Channel (number 7) and the University of Chile Channel (number 9) either belonged to or were openly sympathetic towards the Socialist Party. The situation in the third Chilean TV Channel (number 13, run by the Catholic University) was different. There the influence of the Christian Democratic party was always very strong, and the voice of the left went unhead for most of the time[33].

The party's comprehensive access to mass media was greatly facilitated by the existence of a significant number of Socialist journalists working on non-Socialist newspapers and broadcasting networks. Official party records established that about 20 per cent of all registered journalists in the country in 1970 were either members of, or sympathetic to, the aims of the Socialist Party. Of those journalists specialising in political, economic, labour, international, and social problems in 1970, approximately 35 per cent were Socialist party members or sympathizers.[34]

The final characteristic attributed by Blondel to mass parties is the existence of widespread party images. This refers to the extent to which members and leaders have a

shared image of the party. In other words, leaders of mass parties tend to associate themselves with the party's general image held by supporters and members. Blondel says that 'these images play the part of flags and myths. They lead to certain reactions. They also reinforce party identification and party allegiance against outside attack 'to the extent that . . .the success of party leaders among the electors often depends on the capability of these leaders to fit with the images which followers have of the political party.' [35]

The generally accepted popular image of the Chilean Socialist Party as an extreme party standing to the left of the Communist party certainly played a part in sustaining the influence of extreme radical tendencies within the top and intermediate levels of the party's bureaucratic power structure. Internal voting records on a variety of issues, from 1933 to 1970, confirmed this trend. Moderate or mildly rightist positions were consistently defeated in all congresses, as were moderate and mildly rightist candidates for bureaucratic office. There was always a consistency, then, between the public image of the Socialist party as an extreme leftist political organization and the behaviour patterns of the leadership. Candidates for internal offices with positions which did not respond to this widespread party image were sometimes successful, but they were never able to form a majority. Political views considered moderate were also consistently defeated, for they did not respond to the members' image of the party. Thus a congruence between the party's public image and the images created by the leadership clearly existed. Departures to the right by leaders normally either led to their defeat or resulted in their being reduced to a minority.[36]

Blondel's model is useful, therefore, in the case of the Chilean Socialist Party. Furthermore, my own experience within the party's ranks for ten years reinforces the analysis. It shows a party rather loosely structured along the lines of the mass model, though features which are normally associated with cadre parties – disproportionate influence of notables, factionalism, democratic excesses, electoralism – have also been present in day-to-day practices, at least during the last ten years. Examination of documents and periodicals covering previous periods, and the opinions of the old leaders who were interviewed, substantiate this conclusion.[37] As the evidence that came out of the available data clearly confirmed, the party continuously stressed the need for rank-and-file members not to yield to alien influences – local notables – and to avoid unnecessary discussions which might lead to the degeneration of democratic practices and disrupt the party as an organization working on a permanent basis and not merely for electoral purposes. All the old leaders interviewed were of the same impression, showing strong criticism of these shortcomings.

Perhaps the best summary of this continuous problem is provided by a paragraph from an internal letter sent by the Central Committee to all regional and section committees on July 23, 1961.

> We should remind all comrades that this is a Leninist party, deeply committed to the transformation of the capitalist society . . .How this can be achieved through sporadic, part-time work during election periods only, using the goodwill of some comrades who happen to hold important positions in our society, is something that has to be seen. Furthermore, this vicious tendency to question everything, to discuss irrelevant matters up to the point of exhaustion, is a practice worthy of bourgeois parties, but not of our own.[38]

The role of internal groups within the party is a rather challenging and difficult matter, for there are no studies of Chilean pressure groups which can provide an appropriate frame-

work for analysis. However, voting records within the central committee from 1949 to 1970 provide a partial test of the extent and nature of factionalism within the party.[39]

The issues examined ranged from apparently purely internal administrative matters to major political decisions regarding voting on laws in Parliament. The material on voting appeared in several different documents, but these were kept in the safe for reserved documents in a special archive in the party's headquarters in Santiago. It had been put together by party officials in 1970, as part of a programme to create a party library, but it ultimately failed.[40] A total of 87 decisions which qualified as important were examined. Votes on routine matters such as the site of the party's summer political school each year, or the appointment of secretaries, were not taken into consideration.

From analysis of this voting it appears that factions rose and fell over a period of between three and six years. There was always an extreme leftist faction dominant in more than 90 per cent of decisions. Other factions included: a 'practical' faction, which always worried about the public image of the party and espoused moderate stands if only to avoid public charges of irresponsibility; a Trotskyite faction which adopted doctrinaire arguments in favour of an isolated, ideologically 'pure', and revolutionary party; and finally, a social-democratic faction (led by Allende) which stressed the need for ideological and political accommodation with the Chilean Communist Party. Although these factions maintained their identity through the years, the leaders associated with them were continually in flux. This is to be expected from a party which, we have already shown, was free from any tendencies to oligarchy. Given the ninety per cent dominance of the leftist faction, why was Allende nominated four times as the party's presidential candidate?

This point is related to the wider context of the influence of charismatic leaders in the shaping of mass parties. The Chilean Socialist Party has been led by many people, some of whom have dominated the party's activities beyond question: in the 1930s and 1940s, Marmaduke Grove and Oscar Schnake, and in the 1950s and 1960s, Raul Ampuero and Salvador Allende. These four leaders, gifted with undoubted charismatic qualities, provided the unifying element for an organization always divided by eternal discussions and disagreements. The personalities of these men overrode division in the party's ranks, though their individual position might not accord with party policy. Of the four, only Ampuero was never a presidential candidate. All of them had been Secretary General of the party at some time. Congressmen and Senators.

On several occasions they were all in the minority group within the party, but this did not cause loss of influence or prestige. The only explanation for this can be found in the charismatic nature of their leadership. Only the personality of a charismatic figure could rise above internal party problems, and could provide the much needed impetus which would allow such a party to develop, gain influence and, ultimately, power. The charismatic nature of these leaders, coupled with the anti-Americanism of the Chilean Socialist Party, gave the party an opportunity to develop a strong mass-base which would help to construct a party along European lines.

Conclusions

From the evidence collected, there appears to be little foundation for the argument that oligarches existed within the Chilean Socialist Party. The absence of full-time, paid functionaries within the Socialist party's bureaucratic structure is an important, perhaps determinant, factor in this matter. A situation that is only natural in other mass parties'

organizations (some Communist parties in Western Europe, some African and Asian one-party systems, and even some Western European Socialist parties) could hardly develop in this case. The existence of paid, full-time leaders would, at any rate, encourage the development of oligarchies. The existence of voluntary, unpaid, part-time leaders would, on the other hand, facilitate the development of some democratic patterns in a party's internal practices. A permanent organization based upon voluntary work protected the party from oligarchical developments, but it also created the conditions for clear weaknesses and shortcomings.

It is obvious that a full-time party, based on both middle and working class support, could not rely on a part-time unpaid leadership. The existence at all stages of the party's history, however, of a number of members of Parliament could have prevented these organizational/operational problems. Had the party distributed them reasonably enough among the most important formal bureaucratic bodies, it would perhaps have been able to avoid the most common problem derived from its faculty internal organization: deficiencies in the articulation of the members' demands, lack of correct execution of orders coming from higher political bodies, and a disregard of ideology in practical situations, mainly by the intermediate leadership.

The allocation of posts to civilians, as opposed to parliamentarians, has been a tradition in party procedure and behaviour. The pretext has been that the parliamentarians should concentrate on mass politics, meaning that they should work with the people at large rather than completely envelop themselves in party politics. This policy is reflected in the low proportion of members of congress within both higher (Central Committees and Political Commissions) and intermediate (Regional Committees) leadership offices. Between 1933 and 1939, only 18 per cent of members of Central Committees, 16 per cent of the Political Commissions and 40 per cent of the members of Regional Committees were members of congress. The proportions decreased further in the next period (1939-1953) to 17 per cent, 15 per cent and 3 per cent respectively, and even further in the last 20 years (1953-1973), to 15 per cent, 13 per cent and 2 per cent, respectively.[41] The low proportion of members of Parliament holding leadership positions also reflected the Socialist Party's desire to put the organization firmly under what in party lexicon was known as civilian rule. This trend was also seen in the fact that no member of the party holding important government posts was ever allowed to hold party bureaucratic positions at the same time.[42]

All these elements, together with the voluntary character of the organization, provided the basis for the development of a system of substantial internal mobility. Of all leaders occupying central committee posts between 1946 and 1973, 80 per cent had made their way up to the highest party echelons after beginning at either the local or the intermediate levels. Furthermore, of all leaders occupying regional committee posts during the same time, 90 per cent had come from either sections or *nucleos*, and of all leaders occupying section posts, nearly 100 per cent had come from the *nucleos*.[43] These propositions show a distinct trend towards mobility within the party bureaucratic structure and further refute any suggestion of oligarchical tendencies. The permanent character of Socialist Party organization did not avoid, however, the development of organizational/operational problems. Surprisingly, the existence of mobility within the bureaucratic structure did not help the party. On the contrary, I would suggest that the very existence of this democratic feature in such a class-based and mass-type of party helped to weaken it.

As the party did not have full-time, completely devoted paid officials, mobility caused organizational vacuums at times when strict discipline and concentration were required.

With parliamentarians operating at either Parliament or the level of the masses, and with part-time party officials continuously changing positions, there remained no permanent organization that could really work continuously and effectively. Thus, when party members made various demands on society -- worker pressure for increases in wages, student demands for participation in the administration of the educational system, peasants' petitions for agrarian reform, miners' continuous demands for wages increases – the party would fail to do anything until the last moment, and it would then support the stand taken by other parties, mainly Communists.

In the case of the execution of orders, whatever their nature, the intermediate and lower leadership would in many cases make their own interpretations and adjustments. The tendency to vertical mobility, then, was related to a pattern of bureaucratic instability. However, rising within the bureaucratic structure required from the leaders certain attitude patterns.

Firstly, it required them to present themselved as being well to the left on most ideological and political issues.[44] Secondly, it meant that they had to be very alert to forthcoming internal elections. This caused widespread disorganizations because officials who devoted an important part of their party time to self-preservation, could hardly cope with pressing internal and external political issues to which the party had to direct its attention.[45] Finally, this situation engendered a disregard for petitions from rank-and-file members and an excessive care for pressures and/or demands coming from other leadership levels. This fact helped to isolate the leadership from the membership and to distort the effectiveness of real democratic practices. The satisfactory treatment of other leaders' demands was normal, whilst in the case of the rank-and-file members' demands little appears to have been done.

The need to adopt extreme leftist positions seems to be strongly correlated with needs arising from self-preservation and promotion within the party's bureaucratic structure. Examination of important issues upon which the party had to decide a course of action show that in nearly all cases the successful positions were those standing to the extreme left, while those suffering defeat had adopted moderate postions. This, in turn, was the consequence of the results of most internal party elections for regional and Central Committee members, in which left-wing positions constantly overcame moderate ones. Those who presented delegates' resolutions considered mild and not revolutionary, were continually risking defeat. There was in fact, no single party congress where the moderates gained a majority, though sometimes they managed to win up to 40 per cent of the available seats.[46]

As well as this ideological trend, the need to be ready to face internal elections and to gain promotion within the party's bureaucratic structure created tensions and vacuums which the party was unable to overcome. Already it was an important weakness that no official devoted his full-time attention to the party, and the attitude towards elections only came to aggravate matters. Overlaps of party electoral activity and important political problems were not uncommon, causing delays on decisions and, ultimately, the party, in the absence of its own policies, came to support those of other organizations on certain issues. This was the case, for example, in an important number of laws enacted between 1941 and 1964, according to the opinion of some reliable Socialist members of Congress at the time. It was also certainly true of many of the most important issues affecting the Frei period (1964-1970).[47]

In the opinion of three General Secretaries holding the post for more than three periods each, disregard of demands made by the rank-and-file members has been one of the most pressing problems throughout the party's existence. This is also related, in my opinion, to the inability of the party to provide itself with an efficient bureaucratic machinery. It may also have been caused by the absence of paid officials, especially in internal relations, who might have provided a much-needed, permanent, stable link between higher leadership, intermediate levels and the rank-and-file membership. Instead, what prevailed was a complete lack of consistent inter-relationships between leaders and members; bureaucratic insecurity through people holding voluntary posts which led to irresponsibility and a lack of enthusiasm; and perhaps the gravest of all consequences, the incapacity to satisfy both internal and external demands. All this together led to the verbosity which has always characterized the Chilean Socialist Party leadership. The exact reasons cannot easily be isolated, but they certainly lie in the complex inter-relationships between leaders and members. Whether members' and followers' demands determined extreme leftist stances and language by the leaders, or whether extreme leftist stance and language appealed to a certain type of member is a matter that this work cannot answer. This problem might perhaps encourage further research.

Moreover, the intermediate leadership inclined to disregard the impact which general ideological positions had on relations with other political allies. This was especially so in the area of Socialist-Communist relationships, but other areas such as relations with centre-left parties (Radicals and Christian Democrats), and with Socialist countries were also affected. In the case of Socialist-Communist relationships, the strong anti-Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) attitude of the Communist Party in Chile caused repeated embarrassments to the Socialist leadership, especially when important trade-union and student elections were at stake. The official party line favouring a continuing alliance with the Communists was challenged several times by regional and section committees wishing to ally themselves with the MIR.[48] The urgent Communist plea for political co-operations with moderate leftist parties and, consequently, for recognizing as progressive forces the social strata which those parties allegedly represented (namely the middle class), always encountered strong resistance from Socialist quarters. Despite this, most of the important pleas ended in Socialist acceptance. Again and again, intermediate leadership officials failed in the implementation of these policies and defied orders.

On the whole, the evidence gathered suggests a loose mass party with committee-party practices. But this reality was never understood by Socialist leaders, who repeatedly wanted to see their party as a revolutionary vanguard, structured along the lines of the Leninist *cadre model*. The internal realities of the party consequently had decisive consequences over a variety of important issues, ranging from internal party relationships to external political stands.

NOTES

1. Antonio Gramsci, *Maquiavelo y Lenin,* Ed. Arauco, Santiago, 1970.

   Antonio Gramsci, *Soviets in Italy,* (Pamphlets Series No. 11), Institute for Workers Control, London, 1970.

   Rosa Luxemburg, *The Russian Revolution and Leninism or Marxism?,* Ann Arbour, 1970.

   Monty Johnstone, *Marx, Engels and the concept of the party,* The Socialist Register, 1967.

   Lucio Margri, 'What is a Revolutionary Party?', *New Left Review,* No. 60, 1970.

   Milovan Djilas, *'The New Class,* Unwin Books, London, 1966.

   Rossana Rossanda, 'Class and Party', *The Socialist Register,* 1970.

   Vladimar Illych Lenin, *Selected Works* and *What is to be done?,* Progress Publisher, Moscow, 1968.

   To assess the importance that Marxist researchers and theoreticians give to the class element in the shaping of the party apparatus, see Duncas Hallas, Tony Cliff, Chris Harman and Leon Trotsky's *Party and Class* (essays). Pluto Press, London, 1970.

2. Jean Blondel, *An Introduction to Comparative Government,* Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1969, p. 108.

3. Jean Blondel, (ed.) *Comparative Government, Macmillan, London, 1969, p. 117.*

4. Detailed description of both models can be examined in Rosa Luxemburg's works, notably *The Russian Revolution, Leninism or Marxism?. Spartacus and Junios Pamphlets;* Maurice Duverger's *Political Parties*, Methuen, London, 1972, pp. 133-201; Lucio Margri's discussion about the party in *What is a Revolutionary Party?, op.cit.* Lenin's *What is to be Done?* and *Selected Works, op.cit.*

5. See Duverger, *Political Parties, op.cit.* Methuen, London, 1972, pp. 133.201.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 63.

7. Blondel, 'Mass Parties in Industrialized Societies' in *Comparative Government, op.cit.*, pp.117-126.

8. Blondel, 'Types of Parties and Types of Societies' in *Comparative Government, op.cit.*, p. 135.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 134.

10. Blondel's *Comparative Government* (mainly his two articles). 'Mass Parties in Industrialized Societies' and 'Mass Parties and Types of Modern Societies' include a detailed description of the mass model of party. The *Introduction to Comparative Government (op.cit.),* pp. 108-110, provides useful explanations on the character of class-based parties.

11. Unofficial statistics provided by internal sources. The percentages represent the average, taking into consideration all Central Committees from 1933 up to 1970 and a representative sample of Regional Committees during the same period. (Official party records, 1940, 1950-60 and 1970). Robert Michels's ever relevant observations on the social characteristics of the German Social Democratic party's leadership can be more or less observed here, though middle class preponderance in leadership appears to be less important in the Chilean Socialist party. (See R. Michels, *Political Parties*, Collier Books, New York, 1962.)

12. Oscar Muñoz, *Crecimiento Industrial de Chile* 1914-1965, Universidad de Chile, 1967, p. 194.

13. For further details on educational achievements during the 1938-1950 period in Chile, see the Official Statistics on Educational Development, Ministry of Education, Santiago. Chile, 1952.

14. The examination of 10 associations of writers, journalists, readers' clubs, newspapers' supporters and political associations of various categories in the 1930-1940 period, revealed a 95 per cent membership of middle-class origin against 5 per cent of working class origin. Most of the people included in this 5 per cent were at the same time leaders of leftist groups who had managed to educate themselves guided by intellectual, middle-class friends. The autodidact phenomenon was by no means representative of a tendency or a trend in the working class at that moment.

15. There were 54,800 legal Union members in 1932. The figure went up to 284,300 in 1952. It does not include 'illegal' Unions (some peasants' co-operatives and associations, small unions) during the same period. The figures are indicative of the extent of working class increased participation in their own affairs and suggest a development of social consciousness which was certainly related to the progress made in education and industrialization. (Figures from Alan Angell, *Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile*, Oxford University Press, London, 1972, p. 54 (source: E. Morgado, *Libertad Sindical*, 1967, p. 120). Angell's book includes an acute analysis of the development of the labour movement in Chile.

16. Figures were provided by the respective offices for the universities concerned in 1972.

17. During the first years of this final period, the figures were even more categoric: 90 per cent of students were of middle-class origin, against 2 per cent of working class origin. Figures provided by the *Dirección Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos*, Santiago, Chile, 1971.

18. Blondel, *'An Introduction to Comparative Government', op.cit.*, p. 118.

19. These principles were drawn from the Chilean Constitution of 1925 and party documents covering from 1934 to 1970.

20. Alan Angell, *Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile, op.cit.*, p. 54.

21. Leaders such as Marmaduke Grove, Oscar Schnake, Salvador Allende, Raul Ampuero and others played a vital role in shaping the party's ideology and

reinforcing its firm anti-American stand. If not a *decolonization process,* a ***de-Americanization*** one served the same purposes of *anti-colonialism* in the case of the Chilean Socialist Party, always under the firm guidance of a charismatic leader. Their specific role, however, in shaping concrete models of structure and organization and policies, is difficult to determine but it was certainly important.

22. There exist no official or known unofficial documents establishing the existence of paid party workers. In addition to this, nearly all party Statutes since 1933 have stressed the voluntary character of party work. Financial help has come traditionally from rank-and-file members, though in a rather insufficient and faulty way, thus creating the need for sporadic financial help from wealthy party supporters, but always on a voluntary basis.

23. The problems are partly methodological. It is not enough to find that power holders in a party have been there for long periods, for responsiveness to demands is a more correct criterion for assessing oligarchic tendencies. In the case of the Chilean Socialist Party there are further problems. Firstly. top-level decisions have traditionally been made by the Political Commissions (sub-bodies of the Central Committee, whose composition in most cases is not known). Secondly, the size and period in office of the Central Committee has varied widely at different times from as little as 5 months to as much as three years.

24. Christian Anglade, 'Party Finance Models and the Classification of Latin American Parties' in *Comparative Political Finance* edited by Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Heath and Co., Lexington, Massachusetts, 1970, p. 177.

25. *Memorandum* to leaders and members, mimeographed document, internal use only, 1934, p.2. The memorandum was referring to the fact that no official policy on financing had been established yet, and appealed to 'comrades to show themselves generous' to the party. (p.3).

26. There is no written evidence that the date on which the new system was instituted is correct. However, old party members remember that the previous system had a very short life, certainly not more than 6 months. There is no written evidence, either, on how the system actually worked, as there are no documents on the issue available. My information here comes primarily from conversations with old and reliable party members and leaders.

27. Half a percent of the member's personal income was the proportion considered most of the time. At some stages (elections), this was raised to 1 per cent.

28. Half a percent was normally requested from unskilled workers, only. Twenty per cent was normally requested from members occupying international posts paid in foreign currency.

29. There is an interesting collection of internal *memos* at different times, urging the intermediate leadership officials and members to pay their fees. It was in the private collection of an old socialist leader who was himself Treasurer at various levels, and who managed to get cash from wealthy party sympathizers, when needed. His memory of the task of getting money for the party is both appealing and appalling, because it shows the striking contradiction of a mass, class-based party, with a strong following in trade unions, unable, however, to set up a reasonable system of finance.

30. The opinions of all 5 old former leaders and all present leaders interviewed were unanimous in considering that this was how the party met approximately 90 per cent of its permanent costs.

31. Sources of information included a party leader who had been Treasurer at different levels, including the Central Committee, for more than 20 years, and 5 former leaders. The matter of the party's finances remained one on which the strictest secrecy was requested. No clear written rules exist, and the persons nationally responsible for finances have normally enjoyed considerable autonomy.

32. The party bought the majority of shares in *Ultima Hora* in 1971.

33. Information provided by two party officials in charge of mass communications, August 1972. For a detailed account of mass media ownership in Chile, see Elmo Catalán, *La Propaganda Instrumento de Presíon Política*, PLA, Santiago, Chile, 1970.

34. *Internal Official Records*, 1970 (restricted and confidential use, only). The records registered data for the 1960-1970 period. Information for previous periods was unavailable.

35. Blondel, *Comparative Government, opcit.*, pp. 125-126.

36. A number of 82 editorials on Socialist party political behaviour, written between 1950 and 1968, were examined. 27 of them appeared in the Centreright daily newspaper 'Le Tencera de la Hora', 32 in the Conservative 'El Mercurio' and the rest evenly distributed in the Communist 'El Siglo' (7) the Christian Democratic 'La Patria' (16) and the Socialist 'Ultima Hora' (11). All of them coincided at least at one point: The Chilean Socialist Party stood consistently to the left of the Chilean Communist Party. As the examination covers 16 years, the findings are of relevance at least for the 1950-1970 period. A survey made by the party's own Technical Department in 1969 confirmed the existence of this popular belief: 81 per cent of those interviewed (a sample of 1,500 nationally distributed men and women with voting ages) thought the party 'far' to the left of the Communists (S.P. Technical Department, 1970 internal and confidential document).

37. Periodicals examined covered the 1933-1973 period, and included the following official party organs: *Núcleo*, Valparaiso, 1935-1936; *Acción*, Santiago, 1933; *Acción Socialista*, Santiago, 1934; *Jornada*, Santiago, 1934-1935; *Consigna*, Santiago, 1934-1940; *Espartaco*, Santiago, 1947-1948; La Calle, Santiago, 1949-1955; *Izquierda*, Santiago, 1958-1961; *Arauco*, Santiago, 1959-1967; *Ultima Hora*, Santiago, 1950-1973. All are weekly periodicals, with the exception of *Arauco* (monthly), *Núcleo* (Monthly) and *Ultima Hora* (daily). Also examined was the internal correspondence between different leadership bodies, during the 1933-1970 period (Central Committee, reserved documents, Santiago, 1971).

38. *Internal Circular* of July 23, 1961 (Central Committee, to all Regional and Section Committees), p. 3.

39. For this approach to factions see: Raphael Zariski, 'The Italian Socialist party' a case in factional conflict' APSR, June, 1962, pp. 372-390.; John Martz, 'Dilemmas in the study of Latin-American Political Parties', *The Journal of Politics*, August 1964, pp. 509-531, suggests a similar approch.

40. Most of these data are presumed lost by now, as the party's headquarters were virtually invaded by the military the very day of Allende's overthrow on September 11, 1976. The headquarters were set on fire by the invading units. The destiny of thousands of party documents and private libraries is also uncertain, but there is widespread fear that most of them were destroyed.

41. Statistics were given to the author by reliable party officials, but there are no official records on the matter.

42. For example, posts at ministerial or under-secretary levels, Directors of government enterprises.

43. Unofficial party statistics. Percentages for previous years were not available.

44. See the following internal party documents. *Bulletin*, August 1939, mimeographed; *Bulletin*, August 1941, mineographed; *The Situation of the Country*, report to the PLENO of 1944; *Bulletins* from 1945 to 1963. (Half yearly, three-monthly, and monthly); Party periodicals, notably 'Consigna' (1939-1940); 'La Calle' (1949-1955); 'Izquierda' (1958-1961); and 'Arauco' (1959-1967).

45. This was also true to an important extent in the case of members of Parliament. At least three known reports exist criticizing parliamentarians for having an 'electorally-oriented mind' (*On behalf of a mass policitics*, report to the Central Committee, Santiago, 1964; and *Towards the People's Assembly*, report to the Political Commission of the Central Committee, 1971. Self-incriminating documents on the part of the leadership were less common, but nevertheless there is evidence which suggests that they used their meetings to strongly criticise fellow leaders and themselves for 'arrogant scornful' attitudes and for falling into 'bourgeois, electoralist tendencies'. Strong evidence of this was given to me by reliable party leaders and confirmed by my own experience during the 1960-1970 period.

46. This was the case of the XIXth Ordinary Congress, December 1961, Los Andes (38) and the XXth Ordinary Congress, June 1965, Linares (40). At different stages, the 'moderates' got between 15 per cent and 35 per cent. On the other hand, the 'extreme leftists' were never an homogeneous group, but a mixture of Trotskyites, pro-Cubans, pro-Chinese and others who managed to present a united front against what have been always labelled as 'social-democratic deformations' of the moderates.

47. Lengthy discussions on the agrarian reform, the 'Chileanization' of copper, the educational system reform, the tax reform and others, which took place during this period, ended with the Socialists adhering to the Communist party's generally well-documented stances, thought sometimes reluctantly. The Communist party's propositions appeared to be too mild in the eyes of the Socialist party.

48. As has already been said, elections in a variety of student bodies mainly between 1960 and 1970 provided important data on this. The same can be said of an important number of trade union elections. Funnily enough, somewhat anti-communist attitudes sustained by previous highest echelon leaders before 1960 found rejection in some intermediate bodies that tried then to achieve alliances with the Communisty party.

CHAPTER III

COHESION AND PERFORMANCE IN THE CHILEAN SOCIALIST PARTY

by

Benny Pollack and Waldino Suarez

Introduction

The first requisite to be fulfilled by any political party, if it is to be successful, is to achieve a so-called 'social base'. By social base we mean the degree to which it can rally the support of important sectors of society. The better the performance of a political structure at this level, the more effect its activities are likely to have on the functioning of its political system. In other words, if a political structure is to become relevant, it must build an organisation capable of 'representing' elements of society, 'to get a hold on the country'. Understandably, such a definition of social base has to be more fully operationalised if it is to be of any practical use for our work. This can be reduced to three basic capabilities.

Social mobilization capability refers to the extent to which the party is capable of rallying the electorate behind it. As we will show later on, the development of this capability involves two issues: firstly, the party's ability to attract voters that previously favoured a different party, and, secondly, the success with which a party can pool the support of newcomers. The latter is of utmost importance in cases such as the Chilean one after 1958, when the electorate started to expand very rapidly.[1] It is not suggested that there exists a straightforward correlation between the party's electoral record and its hold on the country (as so many minority but strategically placed parties can show) mainly because the next two elements are equally important, but we do say that the development of this capability is essential if the party is to succeed.[2]

Political mobilisation capability refers to the extent to which the party is able to produce a structure flexible enough to allow the incorporation of new leaders into it, as demanded by its social capability, without undergoing much organisational discontinuity. A failure at this second level may jeopardise its success at the first one. At worst, it might lead to the formation of new parties by the marginal leadership who would eventually compete for the same electorate? This second aspect is important, especially in Latin America, where political parties (mainly large parties) have found it very difficult to perform this task satisfactorily.[3]

It is also important to point out that the process of replacement of leaders presents a two-fold pattern: on the one hand, it reflects the periodic replacement of leaders drawn from groups already represented in the party; on the other, in expanding its social base to newcomers, it needs to include, sooner or later, leaders from these new groups.

Institutional capability encompasses the extent to which parties succeed in using the first two elements of this dimension to attain some control over the instruments of government. Unlike pressure groups, it is not enough for political parties to have a large electorate and a responsive set of leaders; they must also be able to gain office.[4] This capability measures how well the party manipulates its success in the first two resources, in order to attain the maximum possible institutional control of the political system. Needless to say, the type of office they seek is closely related to the norms of the regime; that is why, being a member of a liberal democracy, the performance of the Socialist Party at this level has been studied in relation to its grip on the executive and the legislature.

Finally, if social base is to become an important conceptual tool, there is a further

aspect that cannot be overlooked. This is the 'scope' or 'limitation' of the social base; that is, the strength of the base relative to the strength of the bases of other parties. In other words, the importance of a political aggregate does not entirely depend upon its own performance, but also on how well other political aggregates have succeeded in the same dimensions.[5] A more detailed examination of this concept is found later in this paper. Briefly, there are two elements of this 'scope' relevant to our work. The first is the relative strength of the governing party or coalition, as compared to the strength possessed by other parties. It will be argued that this determines some of the requisites that the party must fulfill at the 'political base' level. The second is the impact that an improvement in the performance of the party at the 'social base' level has upon its performance at the 'political base' level.

But for a political party to be successful, it must have a political base as well as a social base. This refers to the party's capabilities to produce and implement a set of policies both responsive to its 'hold on the country,' and within the limits imposed by the scope of its social base. In other words, for a political party to be 'important', it needs to develop its social base; for its becoming 'successful', it needs also to develop a 'political base'. Although these two dimensions are interdependant, a successful performance in the first dimension is no guarantee of the same thing happening in the second dimension. Therefore, it is possible for a political structure to develop an important 'social base', and still be unable to govern (to use its social base) because it is unable to produce a realistic, coherent, and uniform set of policies.[6] Once a political party has secured a sound social base, its policies require realism, uniformity, and coherence in order to produce the desired results.

Realism refers to the existence of some relation between the scope set by the social base and the degree of change implied in the content of those policies. Do its policies broaden or further complicate the limitations imposed by this scope? As has been suggested earlier, the social base could be looked at from two different standpoints. We can observe the progress made by a political party by examining its performance in relation to the three capabilities listed in the social base, or we can be interested in measuring its real potentiality by comparing a given party's capabilities with those possessed by similar structures in the same political system (the scope). This second aspect of the social base is the more relevant for realism. Given a set of limitations put upon the party, does the latter take them into account when producing policies or not? To the extent that the answer is yes, we say its policies are realistic and fulfil the first requisite of a successful program.

Uniformity refers to the extent to which the political structure is able to support or to back a given set of policies. To what degree is there consensus within the political structure?[7] The importance attached to this second political element stems from the fact that policy makers need to have some widespread consensus among themselves (on which their power is based), if they are going to be able to produce and to implement a stable set of policies over time.

This uniformity takes place at two different levels. Uniformity proper is the degree to which a party agrees on how to behave in relation to each single issue, separately considered. For example, we will want to know whether or not it is the case that Socialist Party members share the same opinion on how to tackle a political problem such as the party's relation with the Christian Democratic party. Ultimately, an index should be produced in order to assess how high this uniformity is concerning the set of most important decisions to be taken by the party. Secondly, intra-issue consensus can be defined as the degree to

which the party's attitudes toward different specific problems that belong to the same general issue, are not contradictory. For example, we might think of a general issue such as 'policy towards the opposition', and select two or three specific problems such as 'attitude toward the Christian Democrats', 'attitudes towards the bourgeoisie', and 'attitude towards middle sectors'. If the people who favour an understanding with the Christian Democrats are the same as those who want to come to terms with some sectors of the bourgeoisie and middle sectors (whose interests could be safely assumed to be articulated and represented by the said party), then we might conclude that the party fulfills this condition satisfactorily. It must not be assumed that this is always so; its importance stems from the fact that its absence may extraordinarily complicate and limit the bargaining power that the party's leaders wield in their dealing with opponents.

The uniform pattern that the whole party or its subgroups should have toward different specific problems related to the same general field, must extend to the compatibility that those groups have to show, regarding their attitude toward different general fields of activity; this is coherence. In other words, the performance of the party at these levels will let us know whether it has been successful in translating the importance attained at the social base into a set of 'workable' policies and, therefore, in obtaining what is considered here as the 'successful formula'. It is not expected that any political structure does in fact successfully fulfill all these roles all the time; as has been said, our basic intention is ultimately to produce an index that could take into account all these differences and the degree of success attained by different parties in different settings.

The Social base of the Socialist Party

The indicators used for the measurement of a given political structure's performance should be flexible enough to account for variations at three levels: at the structural level (indicators used to analyse the role of parties are not likely to be the same as those applied to the study of pressure groups); at the normative level (regimes with conservative authoritarian values produce, say, different types of political participation from those with more liberal outlooks); and at the situational or historic level (where the peculiarities of the setting in which the polity and the structure happen to develop may vary quite considerably).

Let us now see, in the light of these distinctions, how this theoretical framework can help to explain some aspects of the behaviour of the Socialist Party.

Socialist mobilization capability

In order to assess the success attained by the Socialist Party in Chile, it is necessary to take into account the general evolution of the Chilean party system during the last fifteen years. There are a number of important elements that are closely related to Socialist performance at this level. Chile, unlike most of the liberal democracies, experienced a very rapid increase in political participation during this period. Political participation is equated here with electoral participation, because our interest is centred upon the role played by parties. This is shown in Table 1, which quite conclusively demonstrates that the actual rate of participation went up much faster than the increase in population. It is also important to stress the changes that occurred after 1969, because this is the most important period (as will be shown later) when considering the party's social mobilization capability. Between 1969 and 1973, the real level of electoral participation was increased by 51.3 per cent. In

TABLE 1

Participation and population growth[8]

Year	Total Population	Percentage Increase Since 1958	Voters	Percentage Increase in voters since 1958	Turnout	Percentage Increase in turnout since 1958
1958	7,298,000	–	1,497,902	–	1,284,159	–
1961	7,802,000	6.9%	1,858,980	24.1%	1,588,980	44%
1963	8,200,000	12 %	2,570,409	71 %		
1965	8,369,000	14 %	2,915,121	95 %	2,353,123	83%
1969	9,780,000	34 %	3,539,747	136 %	2,307,512	79%
1973	10,000,000	37 %	3,687,105	146 %	3,491,407	171%

short, Chile underwent, during this fifteen years period, a process in which liberal-democratic values, on which its political institutions rested, were fully implemented.[9]

This radical change in the political composition of the country is of the utmost importance if the working of the party system is to be understood. To overstress the political stability of the country and the constitutional continuity enjoyed by it prior to 1973 can be misleading if it obscures these other types of rapid changes that were taking place in Chile.[10] How did the party system adapt itself to such a profound change? Could the existing set of parties expand their social basis accordingly? What was the role played by the Socialist Party in this process?

Three phenomena appear as the most relevant in relation to the above set of questions. Firstly, the party system was not flexible enough to be able to cope with an enlarged active electorate, without creating new parties and reconstructing old ones. Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate that the changing level of political participation has favoured the appearance of new parties, due to the failure of the existing minor parties (prior to 1965), and of some of the major parties, to be responsive to this expanding trend.

TABLE 2

Percentages of votes cast for major political parties, 1953-73

	Congressional Elections					
Parties	1953	1957	1961	1965	1969	1973
Conservative	10.06	13.80	14.80	5.30	20.82	22.70
Liberal	10.90	15.34	16.60	7.50		
Christian Democrat	2.87	9.42	15.93	43.60	31.05	33.30
Radical	13.80	21.47	22.47	13.71	13.59	3.30
Communist	ILLEGAL		11.76	12.73	16.60	16.60
Socialist	14.10	10.68	11.13	10.58	12.76	13.60

TABLE 3

Total vote for major political parties, 1953-73

	Congressional Elections					
Parties	1953	1957	1961	1965	1969	1973
Conservative	78,383	121,223	198,260	121,882	480,523	836,971
Liberal	84,924	134,741	222,485	171,979		
Christian Democrat	22,353	82,710	213,468	995,187	716,547	1,226,804
Radical	106,650	188,526	296,828	312,912	313,559	121,674
Communist	ILLEGAL		157,572	290,635	383,049	612,058
						481,463
Socialist	109,897	93,787	149,122	241,593	294,448	693,900
						824,495

This led to the appearance of new parties (for any practical purpose the Christian Democrats could be considered to be new, since they managed to increase their electoral support from 2 per cent to 43 per cent of votes cast, in only twelve years). This process was accompanied by the remodelling of old parties, the Socialist Party being the best example in the category. Yet it also implied the eclipse of other parties, (such as the Radical Party) that, although keeping their traditional electorate, failed to rally newcomers. This expansionist trend was confined to the six major parties, enhancing the importance of each of them and diminishing that of the minor parties (Table 4).

TABLE 4

Percentage of votes obtained together by 6 major parties in parliamentary elections, 1953-1969

Year	*1953*	*1957*	*1961*	*1965*	*1969*
% of votes pooled by six major parties	70.6	82.7	92.7	93.4	94.9

Finally, it must also be emphasised that this shake-up of the party system did not help the parties to develop well-organised structures. This is clearly the result of the shift that the electorate experienced, first toward the centre, and then to the left, as the participation level increased. This also meant that the bulk of the electorate consistently moved away from the longest standing parties in Chile (Tables 2,3 and 5).

TABLE 5

Right, Centre and Left block voting 1953-1973 (in percentages)

Year	*1953*	*1957*	*1961*	*1965*	*1969*	*1973*
Conservative, Liberals	20.9	29.1	31.4	12.8	20.8	22.7
C.D., Radicals	16.1	30.8	38.0	57.3	44.6	36.6
Communists, Socialists	14.1	10.6	22.8	23.2	29.3	35.2

The reason for this movement can easily be understood. The long-standing parties of the right, although having a good chance of being efficient as far as their political base is concerned, lost their social base (after 1969 this changed slightly) as a result of their inability to rally new voters.[13] In the centre, a new party (the Christian Democrats)[14] became the most important one, and this accounts for the increase in its votes as late at 1965. On the other hand, the collapse of the Radical Party [15] mainly explains the centre's decline after that year. On the left, the most thoroughly remodelled party (the Socialist Party) was responsible for the upswing of the left after the centre started to decline.[16]

We turn now to examine in more detail the role played by the Socialist Party in the process of re-alignment, from which we can deduce how successful it has been in developing its social mobilisation capability. If we concentrate our attention upon the evidence provided by Tables 2 and 3, its success in fulfilling satisfactorily this first requisite of the social base dimension, is highlighted by the electoral trends, as shown in Tables 2 and 6.

It is clear that after 1961, the Socialist Party consistently increased its electoral support, at least keeping pace with the national average. Moreover, after 1969, once the left was in power, it became the fastest growing party in the country. Therefore, its success was crucial for the likelihood of the left wing coalition (had a coup not take place) winning an absolute majority in the future [17] (Table 6).

TABLE 6

Electoral change for various parties 1953-1973

Party	*1953*	*1957*	*1961*	*1965*	*1969*	*1973*
Conservative	–	+54%	+63%	-38%		
Liberal	–	+58%	+65%	-22%	+63%	+74%
Christian Democrat	–	+270%	+158%	+366%	-27%	+71%
Radical	–	+81%	+57%	+5%	nil	-61%
Communist Party	–	–	–	+84%	+31%	+59%
Socialist Party	–	-14%	+59%	+62%	+21%	+135%

Notwithstanding the limitation of the available data, it can be concluded that the Socialist Party was highly successful in the first element of the social base dimension.

The second test for gauging the success of a political party in establishing a 'hold on the country', is related to the personnel of its leadership. This element is especially important in situations where there is a rapid increase in participation, as was the case in Chile. This is so because parties not only face the need to replace personnel periodically without undergoing too much organisational upheaval if they are to remain responsive to demands made by the political system, but they must also open membership to leaders from those new groups entering politics.

Considering the 'structural variable' listed as variables 1 to 8 at the beginning of the statistical codebook used (see Appendix 1), it could be said that the performance of the Socialist Party was remarkable.[18] We believe that this is an important point if meaningful comparisons are to be drawn between it and other Chilean parties. The main factors which seem to demonstrate the success of the Socialist Party, at this level, are the following.

Firstly, an important aspect of what could be called the 'structural political responsiveness' of the Socialist Party, is demonstrated by the large percentage of persons with a working class background among its leadership ranks, as variable 3 shows; for 41 per cent of the respondents were working class. Although other leftist parties (especially the Communist Party) have probably done better than the Socialists on this score, working class representation is by no means negligible.

The relevance of this class representation as far as leadership is concerned, is assessed in the following discussion. On the one hand, there are good grounds to believe that the working class origin of Socialist and Communist Party members do not overlap and, therefore, broadened the social base of *Popular Unity* as a whole. This could be tentatively assumed because it has been generally believed that the Socialist Party was stronger among peasants and miners than amongst industrial workers in the modern sector. This is very important because it accounts for the taking over by a left-wing party of social groups on which the electoral expansion of the centre was heavily dependent during the sixties.

On the other hand, it turned out to be quite capable of absorbing non-traditional middle class groups, such as students, something which is not without significance in a country with a relatively developed middle class. These points are not conclusively proved by the data at our disposal, but the evidence available seems to support them (Table 7).

TABLE 7

Social character of Socialist party leaders

Profession of Leaders	*% of sample*
Peasants	13.04
Industrial Workers	13.04
Miners	15.21
Lawyers	17.39
Physicians	4.34
Lecturers	13.04
Teachers	13.04
Students	6.52
Others	4.34

Political mobilisation within the Socialist Party has also been remarkable, if the age of leaders is considered. Unlike so many other Latin-American and European parties, it did not encounter much difficulty in promoting young people to top positions. For example, we found that 41.3 per cent of leaders interviewed were under 30 years of age, and as many as 80 per cent under 40.

In the third place, it has also been found that the party's structure was responsive to another type of non-traditional leader; namely, politicians lacking university education. This also shows a satisfactory performance at recruiting non-traditional groups. As variable 7 shows, 36.5 per cent of Socialist leaders had only a primary education. It should, finally, be added that this political mobilisation performance has also been found to be satisfactorily fulfilled when turnover of leaders is considered.

Two points should be stressed here: firstly, 71 per cent of the respondents had been in office for the first time when they were interviewed. Secondly, this rapid turnover of leaders

experienced by the Socialist Party did not only coexist with the other three elements of political mobilisation mentioned above, but actually favoured them. This explains why working class, new middle class, young, and primary educated leaders are more heavily concentrated among the new entries in the party (Tables 8 and 9).

TABLE 8
Profession and social class of new entrants to leadership

Class	*New Entries*	*Others*
Working Class	84.2%	15.8%
Middle Class	63.0%	37.0%
Peasants	100	0
Profession		
Industrial Workers	100	0
Miners	57.3	46.7
Lawyers	62.5	37.5
Doctors	50.0	50.0
Lecturers	100	0
Teachers	16.7	83.3
Students	100	0

Note: New entrant refers to those who entered the Party since 1970

TABLE 9
Age and education of leaders

	Age				*Education*	
	30	*31/40*	*41/50*	*51/60*	*University*	*Primary*
New entrants	94.7%	72.2%	25.0%	0%	65.4%	88.2%
Others	5.3%	27.8%	75.0%	100%	34.6%	11.8%

Therefore, we may also conclude that the Socialist Party was capable of building a structure that could absorb new leaders very satisfactorily. In other words, the Socialist Party was also successful as far as this second element of its social base is concerned.

The Institutional Capability of the Socialist Party

The success of the party in relation to the first two elements of this first general dimension paved the way for the Socialist Party to become a major political force in the Chilean political system. Nevertheless, this strength would have remained merely potential, unless the party were able also to get some control of the institutional machine. The Socialist Party's effectiveness at this level has been studied by observing its performance in relation to the two governmental branches most accessible to political parties, and most closely associated with state activities: the legislature and the executive.[19]

The Socialist Party had a steadily increasing representation in Parliament (Table 10).

TABLE 10
Parties congressional representation
(number of seats, lower chamber)

	Years				
	1957/61	*1961/65*	*1965/69*	*1969/73*	*1973/-*
Conservative	22	17	3	34	34
Liberal	32	28	6	–	–
Christian Democrat	14	23	82	55	50
Radical	36	39	20	24	5
Communist	–	16	18	22	25
Socialist	13	12	15	15	28

Nevertheless, if vote/seat ratios are considered, the party no longer appears to have been so successful. In other words, it found it very difficult to translate its votes into seats. Unfortunately, this point has not been given the attention it deserves, but we can compare the record of four parties widely represented in the four districts of the province of Santiago 20 (Table 11).

TABLE 11
Vote/seat ratio

Party	*Average Vote Cost of Seats*
Christian Democrat	35,053 votes
National Party	39,033 votes
Communist Party	40,611 votes
Socialist Party	45,313 votes

Contrary to its limited efficiency at controlling the legislature, the Socialist Party showed a considerably higher institutional capability as far as the executive branch is concerned. Briefly, its higher capability appears to be linked to two facts. On the one hand, the President was a member of the party; this is clearly a factor of considerable importance in a presidential regime, even when government is based on a coalition. On the other hand, the party also managed to control the largest number of ministerial portolios given to any party throughout Allende's administration, among which we find some of the most important ministries. These two facts, documented in Tables 12 and 13, suggest that, notwithstanding its institutional weakness, the Socialist Party should be considered the strongest partner in the governing coalition. They also help us guess where its weight was most strongly felt.

The conclusion is not so clear as it was in the case of the first two elements of this dimension. The failure to control its fair share of the legislative power is manifest, but, nevertheless, it seemed to have compensated by overrepresentation in the executive. It is very difficult to assess the importance that this gap in institutional efficiency had for the political stability of this period. A far more detailed study of roll-calls in the Chilean Parliament would be needed in order to reach more specific conclusions on this point.

TABLE 12
Distribution of portfolios by party, 1970-73

	Nov. 70	*Oct. 71*	*Jan. 72*	*Jan. 72*	*Dec. 72*	*Mar. 73*	*May 73*
Foreign Affairs	SP	SP	SP	SP	SP	SP	SP
Interior	SP	SP	RP	SP	IND.	SP	SP
Defence	RP	RP	SP	SP	SP	SP	SP
Education	RP	RP	RP	RP	RP	RP	RP
Mining	RP	RP	RP	PIR	IND.	CL	CL
Agriculture	MAPU	MAPU	MAPU	MAPU	SP	SP	SP
Housing	SP	SP	SP	RP	IND.	IND.	IND.
Labour	CP	CP	CP	CP	CP	CP	CP
Public Works	CP	CP	CP	CP	IND.	SD	SD
Finance	CP	CP	CP	CP	CP	CP	MAPU
Justice	API	API	API	PIR	CP	CP	CP
Health	SD	MAPU	MAPU	MAPU	MAPU	MAPU	MAPU
Land Settlement	SD	SD	SD	SD	SD	API	API
Economy	MARU	MAPU	MAPU	MAPU	MAPU	MAPU	CP
Secretary General	SP	SP	SP	SP	SP	RP	RP

TABLE 13
Distribution of ministers by party, 1970-73

	Nov. 70	*Oct. 71*	*Jan. 72*	*Jan. 72*	*Dec. 72*	*Mar. 73*	*May 73*	*Sep. 73*
Socialist	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Radical	3	3	3	2	1	2	2	3
Communist	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Social Democrats	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Independent	1	1	1	0	4	2	2	4
MAPU	2	3	3	3	2	2	2	0
Radical Left	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0

However, looking back to the Socialist Party's performance in relation to the three elements of the 'social base', the general conclusion is bound to be that the Socialist Party had fulfilled the first task a successful party should accomplish. It had managed to produce a structure capable of being highly responsive to the changing situation of the Chilean electorate, of recruiting leaders accordingly, and of using this popular and political support to become a key element in the formation and duration of any left-wing government.

From the point of view of the social base, whatever the performance of the Socialist Party in the second dimension had been, its success cannot be denied. It did fulfill, to a large extent, the first qualification that a general organisation must meet if it is to be 'important': to become representative of an important sector of its political system.

As we suggested earlier, in order to be able to establish the links between the two dimensions, there is another script related to the social base that should be dealt with. This is the 'scope'. It has already been said that the main role of this dimension is to allow a political group to become 'important'. Furthermore, there is another element also relevant to the working of a political structure. This is its relative strength in comparison to the social base developed by other parties that might oppose it.

This limitation or 'scope' may influence the success of the political system and structure in the second dimension in two ways. Its policies must be orientated toward the further expansion of this social base. What is meant by limitation at the first level is easily understood if the composition of the Legislature is observed (Table 10). But an expansion in the first dimension might make success more difficult to obtain in the second dimension.

The Political Base

In this third section we turn our attention to the study of whether the party was also able to produce a structure in order to work out a set of policies that would both enhance its social standing and transform its social base potentialities into actual power. We want, therefore, to know whether the Socialist Party was also 'efficient' in this dimension. To summarise in a few words how well or badly a political structure fulfills the three qualities included in our category called 'political base', seems to be an impossible task. Therefore, we faced the inevitability of being selective, and have reduced it to the following points. Did the general, ideologically-bound policies pursued by the Socialist Party contribute to its control of the Chilean political system or hinder it?

Apart from being difficult to define, 'ideology' seems to imply one knows what 'should' be done by governments. The concept is used here in a much more specific way, and refers to those policies and attitudes that are more related to long term objectives, rather than specific decisions with immediate consequences.[21]

We found that general values could enhance the party's prospects for success by producing a set of objectives about which there was widespread agreement. This fulfilled the second and third requisites of 'political base', and reduced the limitations inherent within the party's diffuse structure. Obviously, there is no way to 'prove' that ideological factors alone were responsible, but their involvement can be surmised. It is possible to prove that there was a set of general objectives whose perception by the party's leaders fulfilled both the uniformity and coherence requisites of 'political base'.

For example, there was absolute agreement about the depth of reform to be introduced in Chile, as is shown by party leaders' attitudes toward general issues such as education, justice, mass media, and private property. Let us consider a relevant section of our questionnaire (see Appendix I):

Question 43 Is Chilean Justice in your opinion a class justice?[22]

Answer Yes, because it puts rich above poor. (100 per cent)

Question 44 Should the mass media in Chile 1) remain in the hands of their actual owner? 2) be expropriated and administered directly by the state? 3) be expropriated but administered by the workers of each media concerned? 4) be expropriated and administered by a council of workers appointed by trade unions?

Answer They should be expropriated but administered by the workers of each type concerned (100 per cent).

Question 45 Should the Chilean system of socialism permit, 1) only state ownership, directly administered by the state on a centralised basis? 2) state ownership in 'strategic industries', allowing some forms of private ownership as well in small and medium land-owning, and small and medium trading activities? 3) state ownership only, but with councils of workers in charge of admini-

stration? 4) state ownership, as in 3), but also with some form of private ownership as in 2)? 5) community ownership, owned and administered by workers?

Answer **It should permit state ownership only, but with councils of workers in charge of administration.** (100 per cent)

Question 46 Do you think that education in Chile should be the responsibility of 1) only the state? 2) state and private enterprise? 3) Private enterprise only?

Answer It should be the responsibility of the state (100 per cent response).

This unifying role played by 'ideology' was not limited to a consensus around some basic general policies or objectives, but also extended to the line along which the party should be organised. For example, the following questions were asked.

Question 9 The Socialist party statutes say that 'democratic centralism' means the democratic election of all leaders, leadership accountability, that decisions taken by any authoritative body should be obeyed, that minorities accept majority decisions, and that mutual respect prevail. Do you agree or disagree with that definition?

Answer **I agree** (100 per cent)

They also favoured a cadre-party, as question 25 shows:

Question 25 Which would you think is the best organisational model for your party?

Answer A cadre-party (100 per cent)

This is what we defined as the 'functional aspect of ideology', because it helps to harmonise an heterogenous party, producing a set of objectives common to all its members. In other words, it helps to develop its 'political base'. Nevertheless, the influence wielded by the ideological commitment cannot be thoroughly analysed unless its 'dysfunctional aspect' is also considered.

These general objectives do not fulfill the first of the three requisites that any policies of a party should possess, namely, realism. On the one hand, they seem to help to overcome problems presented by the Socialist party's structural diffuseness, whereas, on the other, they do not seem to help to solve obstacles created by the minority condition of the party. In other words, a party that sets as its main objective the complete transformation of the political system, reduces its chances of broadening its 'scope'. Therefore, unless it is very well organised, and acting in a very special situational period (such as the collapse of a regime), this is likely to be a liability rather than an asset.[23]

The will to transform the entire society is quite plainly shown in the following examples.

Question 23 Do you think that the Chilean road to socialism should respect the separation of powers which the Constitution clearly establishes, or should it rather replace it by another model?

Answer **It should replace the system** (100 per cent)

Question 26 Should the Popular Unit government in your opinion accelerate the Chilean process? diminish it? or maintain it?

Answer It should accelerate it (100 per cent)

Furthermore, the agreement in principle about how the party should be organised, helped to confuse 'official party' (it could also be called 'ideal party') with 'real party'. This is a confusion that Socialist Party's members were very much prone to make. As question 10 shows, not only did the party agree about the advantage of putting into practice the 'democratic centralism' principle, but they also thought that this principle was wisely applied within the Socialist Party.

Question 10 Do you thank that the Socialist Party practises democratic centralism?

Answer Yes (71.7 per cent)

At the same time, they gave good examples of how this could be, and in fact, was ignored by themselves when the occasion arose. For example,

Question 22 President Allende has repeatedly said that the Chilean road to Socialism does not imply an attack to the traditional civil liberties that the Chilean people have conquered through many years of struggle against the bourgeoisie. He adds that civil liberties as practised up to now will be entirely maintained, even when the stage of the consolidation of socialism comes. Do you agree or disagree with his opinion?

Answer I disagree (80 per cent)

A similar situation existed in relation to the problem of whether the party was a mass or a cadre party.

Question 24 Do you think that the Socialist Party is a mass or a cadre party?

Answer The Socialist Party is a cadre party. (88.7 per cent)

And the importance of the divisions within their party's ranks was also played down.

Question 50 It is said that within the party there are several 'tendencies' and/or groups. Some people have even given names to those groups (*guatones, guatapiqueros*, Cuban lobbyists, Social Democrats, trotskyites). Do you think that those views are correct? If yes, please state to which group you would belong to. If not, please elaborate.

Answer Yes. There are differences of opinion but no fractions within the party. So, there are groups in a sense over concrete matters, but no ideological differences. (100 per cent)

Question 12 With which of the following propositions would you agree?

Answer Ninety four per cent agreed that the congresses of the party express the internal democracy that prevails, delegates are freely elected and without any kind of undue pressure from either groups or persons. They all have the same opportunities to participate in discussions with only the limitations imposed by mutual respect. Any delegates can really elect and be elected to any party post through the practice of normal voting procedures.

But there are reasons to believe that this was not necessarily the case. Firstly, the expansion experienced by the Socialist Party's social base

suggests that the party did not exactly fit the evolutionary pattern one expects a cadre party would follow. The respondants themselves also provide good reasons to doubt their attitude towards problems that can be related to the composition of the party. For example, question 49 shows how disorganised the party could be.

Question 49 Do you pay your fees regularly?

Answer Not regularly. (80 per cent)

Such a high figure implies that the party was far from well organized. For example, Socialist Party members used to be required to make payments before congress meetings, whereas (according to the last question) this was no longer the rule in 1972.[24]

Party members also showed far more fundamental splits than the one just mentioned, if we consider their own perception of the party as shown in their answers. For example, their common ideology did not help them to bridge the differences caused by the various socio-economic backgrounds.

Question 14 How would you define the working class?

Answer All agreed, with a Marxist-type definition, that the working class represents both manual and intellectual workers. But 52 per cent thought industrial workers were more important, 26 per cent thought peasants were more important, and 22 per cent thought both were equally important.[25]

It seems then that the Socialist Party failed to make use of a common ediology to expand its 'scope for manoeuvre' by agreeing to a set of policies that were not compatible with its minority status, and by failing to recognize the distinctions between its structure as ideologically defined ('official party'), and as it existed in reality ('real power').

Policy implementation

This section is devoted to the assessment of whether the Socialist Party, notwith standing its ideological shortcomings, could produce a set of 'workable policies' that would have made it a successful party. The potential number of issues and policies that could be considered here is limitless; therefore, we have been forced to make a selection. This has been done by accepting the limitations of the data at our disposal and by clustering the issues around the four fields of governmental activity that were most closely related to the portfolios held by Socialist ministers.

Clearly, the party failed the first test of realism. This is mainly due to the unwillingness of its members to compromise with the Christian Democrats. The evidence provided looks quite conclusive.

Question 27 If President Allende decided now to ask the Christian Democratic Party to enter the governmental coalition, would you say that this would reinforce the government, weaken it, or make no difference?

Answer It would weaken it. (83 per cent)

This attitude also extended to groups thought to be represented by the Christian Democrats.

Question 28 Do you think that the support of the so-called 'middle-sectors' should be obtained for the government?

Answer Eighty–three per cent thought that this should not be done but that further Socialist type measures should be taken instead.

It is interesting to note that the quasi-unanimity shown by party members in their hostility toward non-governing sectors, is not sustained on other topics linked to this same issue. Party members bitterly opposed the idea of forming an alliance with the Christian Democrats, but at the same time, did not agree among themselves about what the party's actual position was in relation to the middle sectors. For example, they were badly split as to whether the bourgeoisie was in fact represented or not by their own party.

Question 16 In your opinion, does it represent other social strata?

Answer Fifty-two per cent thought it represented the small bourgeoisie, forty-eight that it represented the small and medium bourgeoisie.

The lack of consistency in the attitude that Socialist Party members had toward specific problems demonstrates the inability of the party to produce working policies and to back them as a political unit. A very striking example is provided by the fact that their view on how the middle bourgeoisie should be represented by the party was not related to their view of what their relations with the Communist Party should be. We found this quite striking because the Christian Democrats, after all, were the party that represented that bourgeoisie. This lack of intra-issue consensus or consistency further reduced the party's ability to become a successful political structure in the difficult situation affecting Chile at the moment.

TABLE 14

Support for Christian Democratic-Socialist alliance with differing sectors

	for	*against*
Small/medium bourgeoisie	19.4%	80.6%
Small bourgeoisie only	10.0%	90.0%

Therefore, it might be summarily concluded that, as far as this first field activity is concerned, the Socialist Party also developed its political base unsatisfactorily.

Was the party any more successful in its relations with its partner in government, the Communist Party? There is also little doubt that to have favoured a stronger alliance with the Communists would have improved the party's own social base, mainly by reducing some of the limitations imposed by its scope. Its feelings at this level were inevitably mixed. This was basically due to the difference between the party's attitude 'in principle' toward the Communists, and its 'practical' behaviour on the same matter. At first sight, members showed a satisfactory amount of realism, as a result of their being unanimously in favour of creating a united party of the left.

Question 37 Would you approve the organisation of a united party of the Chilean revolution, including Communits and Socialists?

Answer Yes. (all)

Furthermore, they all seemed, in principle, aware of the need to strengthen the existing coalition, as question 40 shows.

Question 40 Do you think that the Communist-Socialist alliance should be reinforced, weakened, allowed to follow the actual pattern?

Answer It should be reinforced. (All)

Notwithstanding this impressive show of left-wing solidarity, once they were questioned about topics that implied a much more practical commitment than the one accepted in the abstract, their confidence in their partner seems to be a lot more limited. For example, if it is remembered that the questionnaire was administered a few months before the coup that put an end to the Popular Unity government, and when political tension were already high, the answer to our next question looks highly unrealistic.

Question 38 Should the union take place now, in one years' time, or at some time in the future?

Answer At some time in the future (All)

The unanimity shown in the questions reproduced above, diminished in practical areas too. For example, one third of the respondents were very critical of past Communist-Socialist alliances, and were in open disagreement with the rest of their own party.

Question 32 How do you think the Socialist-Communist alliances have been?

Answer Bad (33 per cent)

Considering the importance and the long-standing nature of conflicts that have characterised Communist-Socialist relations throughout contemporary Chile, it is interesting to look at the origin of this lack of trust shown by the Socialists. Briefly, two factors account for the inability of the Socialists to embrace a more united left front. Firstly, suspicions about the intentions and aims of the Communists were high. This was strongly felt in relation to links between the Chilean Communist Party and that of the USSR. As questions 35 and 36 show, the Socialist Party did not have a favourable opinion of the Communist Party's stand on these matters.

Question 35 Do you think that the tactics and strategies of the communists are somehow related to the particular needs of Soviet policies?

Answer Yes. (71 per cent)

Question 36 Would you say that the Communist Party generally practices the so-called 'Marxist-Leninist' procedures which are considered inherent to a Marxist-Leninist party?

Answer No (80 per cent)

Secondly, suspicions about the ability of the Communist Party to impose itself upon the rest of the left-wing movement were widespread, as question 33 shows.

Question 33 Do you think that the Communist Party is in fact imposing its views on tactics upon the government?

Answer Yes. (78.3 per cent)

It is unfortunate that the available data is scanty in relation to defence and foreign affairs because these were the two portfolios dominated by the Socialist Party. Lack of

information has forced us to change the method used so far and reduced our analysis to more general points. This is basically why, as has been explained earlier, the testing of what has been defined as inter-issue consensus could not be developed. Notwithstanding all these obstacles, this field is too important to omit an assessment of the Socialist Party's role in government. The importance stems from the fact that because of the radical character of the changes the Socialist party was committed to introduce, very serious questions must be asked as to whether this could have been done without initiating a constitutional change. In fact, only 30 per cent of respondents thought socialism could be achieved within a liberal democratic framework.

What is really relevant was the inevitability of controlling the army if such a constitutional break was ever to occur. The extraordinary thing is that only 12 per cent of Socialist Party members seriously considered this problem (see Question 29), and only 15 per cent of those who actually claimed a proletarian dictatorship should be set up, mentioned the role of the army. This lack of realism and uniformity in the Socialist Party's relation to what was going on was to prove a crucial element in Chilean politics, and probably the most serious problem in the Socialist Party's failure to build a political base.

In foreign affairs, it is obvious that the Popular Unity government in Chile invoked the open animosity of its main external commercial partner, the U.S.A. Nonetheless, the question remains whether the party could have diversified its foreign links or minimised its confrontation with traditional partners. Why this did not happen is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this essay.

Notwithstanding these differences, we believe that unlike its success at the social level, the Socialist Party was unable to produce a set of 'workable policies' which would have enabled us to classify it as possessing all features of a successful political aggregate.

Conclusion: the development dilemma

This apparantely incompatible and contradictory role of the Socialist Party in relation to the two dimensions considered in this paper, is by no means coincidental, peculiar to the Socialist Party, or even peculiar to the Chilean political system. We believe this phenomenon to be common to transitional countries undergoing important political change.

Whenever a political system faces rapid change in the socio-economic composition of the society it controls, its political structures must either be responsive to those changes or perish. But if the structure is responsive (social base), its capability for behaving coherently (political base) becomes a lot more difficult to attain.

Because one dimension seems to limit the second, we have chosen to call it the 'development dilemma'. In other words, can a political structure be adjusted to rapid change without lowering its capacity to act? Needless to say, this dilemma is most apparent in a situation such as Chile's between 1969-73, where the political landscape was more ambiguous than it was in the Soviet Union in 1917.

Obviously, this is a subject where the argument is not going to be exhausted in the near future; nonetheless, we hope that, with future research, we might start to see some common patterns in the relationships between these two dimensions in so-called transitional societies. In general, we find that the case of the Socialist Party is one where the gap is at its maximum, making the assessment of the party's performance both difficult and controversial

FOOTNOTES

1. Chile had expanded its electorate very rapidly in the last twenty years through a number of electoral reforms. The last one took place in 1971, when illiterates were allowed to vote for the first time. The relevance of this fact and its influence upon the party system, we feel, has not been sufficiently examined. In relation to this topic, the influence that changing electoral laws have upon the party map can be gauged by comparing the Chilean party system before 1958 with the present one. See for reference: E. Cruz-Coke, *'Geografía Electoral de Chile,'* Del Pacifico, Santiago, 1958. For a good introduction to the study of electoral laws, see: *'The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws', passim.*

2. Again, it is important to stress that we are not stating a linear correlation between the party's electoral socio-economic features and those of its leaders. There is some empirical evidence against the exactness of such a correlation (see for instance D. Searing and L.J. Edinger in *'Social Background in Elite Analysis'. APSR,* 1967, pp. 428-445). But we do say that, as a country changes its socio-economic pattern, so must its parties and other political structures change their recruitment criteria because the former changes are likely to give birth to new contenders for power.

3. The history of the Argentine Radical Party, and to some degree the Chilean one as well, is a good example of how lack of 'political mobilisation' within the party's structures has led to further fractionalisation of the party system.

4. For a more detailed analysis of this distinction, see J. Meynaud, *'Pressure Groups'.*

5. As will be seen later, this is most important when analysing the second dimension at which political parties work. The actual strength obtained by a political group, say, in attaining office also depends on the degree of decay in the political system. As far as Chile is concerned, it could be argued that a socialist revolution as stated by Socialist party's members, was impossible, not only because the left was not well enough organised but also because traditional groups were able to resist it.

6. See details in B. Pollack, 'The Chilean Socialist Party: Prolegomena to its Structure and Organization', *Journal of Latin American Studies,* Vol. 10, No. I, 1978, 117-152.

7. This second requisite might be found close to Almond's aggregative function of parties (see G. Almond, *Comparative Politics*), although that does not mean we should arrive at similar conclusions. For a definition of areas, see J. Blondel, *Introduction to Comparative Government*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1969, *Appendix.*

8. See A Boron, 'Movilizacion Política y Crisis Política en Chile, 1920-70'. *ELACP,* n. 17, Santiago, 1970 and R.H. Ampuero, Jr., 'Chilean politics and the role of the legislature 1958-73', unpublished third year project, University of Essex, Department of Government, 1974.

9. This does not seem to be emphasized strongly enough by those interested in explaining the sudden collapse of Chile's stability. It is important to stress these drastic changes experienced by the political system, although it did not undergo any constitutional break before 1973.

10. This seems to be the pattern in most introductions to Latin America, wherever comparisons between Chile and other Latin American countries are drawn.

11. The figures for 1973 had been estimated. The first figures assumed that the representation in parliament (lower chamber) is exactly proportional to the votes obtained by each party. The second figures, however, consider the different 'average cost' paid by left wing parties in order to translate their electoral records into parliamentary representation. As will be seen later, the Socialist Party's average has always been higher than the Communist Party's; that meant that it actually got more votes than its congressional representation would suggest. For more details see R.H. Ampuero, *op.cit.*, p. 17. Our estimate is based on a provisional testing carried out on Santiago's province results. From a conservative point of view, it could safely be assumed that Communist Party's average cost has been between 15-20 per cent lower than the Socialist Party's.

12. R. Ampuero, *op.cit.*, p. 16, Table 8.

13. In order to avoid overstretching the length of this paper, we reduced the evidence to prove this point to tables reproduced in the text plus a few references in relation to the major parties quoted here.

14. See: R. Boizard, *'La Democracia Cristiana en Chile'*, Del Pacifico, Santiago, 1967.–

15. See: P.G. Snow, *'Radicalismo Chileno'*, Andrés Bello, Santiago, 1968.

16. See M. Casanueva, *El Partido Socialista y la Lucha de Clases*, Quimantu, Santiago, 1972.

17. In order to see the importance of level of participation after 1970, see A. Giusti, 'Political Participation in Chile', *ELACP*, n. 30.

18. See codebook.

19. The judiciary was not considered because, from our point of view, it could safely be considered outside party politics. As far as the congress is concerned, we only considered the lower chamber due to the fact that the electoral technique used in electing the senate (50 per cent at a time) makes it very difficult to use as an indicator of institutional capability.

20. It would be necessary to measure this average on a nation-wide scale before being able to assess fully its impact.

21. This problem is by no means meaningless. Its most relevant aspect, so far as this paper is concerned, stems from the fact that 'ideology' has basically been used in order to sort out parties into categories; as can easily be guessed, this way of applying this concept has a very limited value for actually understanding its impact upon the working of parties.

22. See appendix 1.

23. It is not felt that we could give a definite solution to the problem of whether the

Socialist Party collapsed because it was going too slow or too fast. We argue that the radicalism of its policies did not match the picture presented by the Socialist Party's social base.

24. This was certainly the case before the Socialist Party's split in 1967.

25. According to our data, this disparity could be explained by the different backgrounds of the leaders.

APPENDIX I

Socialist Party Questionnaire

1. *Respondent* 01-46

2. *Type of Committee:*
   1 Regional Committee North (miners)
   2 Regional Committee Centre (industrial)
   3 Regional Committee South (peasants)
   4 Political Commission

3. *Social status:*
   1 Working Class
   2 Middle Class

4. *Type of Occupation:*
   1 Peasant
   2 Industrial worker
   3 Miner
   4 Lawyer
   5 Physician
   6 Lecturer
   7 Teacher
   8 Student
   9 Other (merchant – publisher)

5. *Age:*
   1 18-30
   2 31-40
   3 41-50
   4 51-60
   5 over 61

6. *Personal status:*
   1 Married
   2 Single

7. *Education:*
   1 University
   2 Secondary
   3 Primary

8. *Times in Office:*
   1 One time
   2 Two times
   3 Three times
   4 Four and over

(Attitudinal Variables)

9. The Socialist Party statutes say that 'Democratic Centralism' means democratic election of all leaders, systematic checking of procedures and behaviour of the leadership by those who gave them office, decisions taken by any authoritative body should be obeyed, and subordination of minorities to majority and mutual respect.

Note: This questionnaire was administered in February to July 1973 to a sample of the members of the Central Committee and three full Regional Committees. These were administered by the author. The leadership committees were selected according to the social-economic peculiarities of the Chilean provinces, so as to have a random representation of all the main characteristics of that country's social and economic infraestructure. For further details as to methodology and statistical tools used see B. Pollack, *The Structure and Organization of the Chilean Socialist Party*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Liverpool, Department of Political Theory and Institutions, 1979.

Do you agree with that definition?

1 Agree
2 Disagree

10. *Do you think that is true in the case of the Socialist Party?*

1 Yes
2 No

11. What do you think of Lenin's, Gramsci's and Trotsky's ideas on 'Democratic Centralism'. Which one of those definitions do you prefer and why?

1 Did not know at all
2 Knew something but against concentration of power
3 Knew but in favour of 'Leninist' concept

12. *With which of the following questions would you agree?*

1 The congresses of the party express the internal democracy that prevails, delegates are freely elected and without any kind of undue pressure from either groups or persons. They have all the same opportunities to participate in discussions with the only limitations imposed by mutual respect, so, any delegate can really elect and be elected to any party post through the practice of normal electoral procedure.

2 The congress of the party expresses different group interests, and delegates represent the tendencies that those groups support. The group with more power will be the one which will eventually win and its delegates will get most of the important posts.

13. There are some names which appear repeatedly in party central committees throughout the years (we shall quote them)

Is this because of the person's:

1 Capacity (traditional approach)
2 Ideology (dogmatic approach)
3 Ability to place himself in important places (opportunist approach)
4 Other (capacity – ideology)

14. *How do you define the working class?* Agreed answer with a Marxist type definition: working class represents both manual and intellectual workers. *But:*

1 Industrial workers are more important than peasants in pushing the revolution
2 Peasants are more important
3 Both

15. The socialist party defines itself as the 'vanguard of the proletarian class'. *Do you think it can also represent properly other social sectors or strata? Which ones?*

1 It can represent small and medium bourgeoisie besides workers
2 It can represent only small bourgeoisie besides workers

16. *In your opinion, does it represent other social strata?*

1 It represents small bourgeoisie
2 It represents small and medium bourgeoisie
3 It represents small, medium and large bourgeoisie

17. *Do you think that in general the social origin of party leaders is similar to that of party members?*

1 Similar
2 Not similar

18. *If answer no, do you think that is a problem?*

1 Not a problem
2 A problem
3 Not applicable

19. *If answer yes, in what do you think it is a problem?*

1 Agreed answer: Petty bourgeoisie leadership has the limitations of not being of working class origin; bourgeois interests as opposed to workers' interests.
8 not applicable.

20. *If answer no (to question 18), why is it not a problem?*

2 Agreed answer: No problems at all with petty bourgeois leaders: they adopt the view points of the working class.
8 not applicable.

21. The party's declaration of principles says that 'there is only the militant of the party' and there is no separation of identity between the militants as private persons and as public persons. *Do you agree with this or not?*

1 Agree
2 Disagree

22. President Allende has said repeatedly that 'the Chilean road to socialism' does not imply an attack to the traditional civil liberties that the Chilean people have conquered through many years of struggle against the bourgeoisie. He adds that civil liberties as practiced up to now will be entirely maintained even when the stage of the consolidation of socialism comes. *Do you agree or disagree with his opinion?*

1 Agree
2 Disagree

23. Do you think that the 'Chilean road to socialism' should be respectful of the actual separation of powers which the Constitution clearly establishes or should it rather replace it by another model?

1 Maintain
2 Change

24. *Do you think that the socialist party is a mass or a cadre party?*

1 Mass party
2 Cadre party

25. *Which would you think be the best organization model for your party?*

1 Mass party
2 Cadre party

26. *The UP government should in your opinion:*

1 Accelerate the Chilean process
2 Diminish it
3 Maintain it

27. If president Allende decided now to ask the Christian Democratic party to enter the governmental coalition, *would you say that this fact*

1 Would reinforce the government
2 Would weaken it
3 Would not modify the present situation

28. *Do you think that the support of the so called 'middle sectors' should be obtained for the government?*

1 Through the satisfaction of their demands for consumption
2 Through the denial of these demands and the furthering of socialist-type measures

29. *Which 'model' would you consider to be the more appropriate for the actual stage of building Chilean socialism?*

1 Liberal democracy
2 Proletarian dictatorship
3 Communitary socialism
4 Proletarian dictatorship with military participation

30. *Enumerate what you consider to have been the deficiencies of the government in handling the so called 'October crisis'*

1 Agreed answer: government's weakness with the strikers

31. *To whom or/and what factors (persons/countries/institutions) would you make responsible(s) for the violent opposition (strikes, bombing, verbal abuse, economic boycotts, etc.) to the government?*

1 North-American imperialism – national bourgeoisie
2 National bourgeoisie – North-American imperialism
3 Both
4 Landowners

32. *Do you think that the socialist-communist alliance has been (for the development of the Socialist Party):*

1 Good
2 Bad
3 Unimportant
4 DK (Don't know)

33. *Do you think that the Communist Party is in fact imposing its views on tactics upon the government?*

1 Yes
2 No
3 DK

34. *Do you think that the Communist Party is organized and strong enough to be able to impose its views as the best strategy towards a 'Chilean model of socialism'?*

1 Yes
2 No

35. *Do you think that the tactics and strategies of the communists are somehow related to the particular needs of Soviet policies?*

1 Yes
2 No
3 DK

36. *Would you say that the communist party generally practices the so called 'Marxist-Leninist' procedures which are considered inherent to a Marxist-Leninist party?*

1 Yes
2 No

37. *Would you support the organization of a united party 'of the Chilean revolution', including socialist and communist?*

1 Yes
2 No

38. *Union good:*

1 Now
2 In one year
3 Sometime in the future

39. If answer yes to question 37, *the party of the Chilean revolution should be:*

1 Confederate
2 Unitary

40. *Do you think that the communist-socialist alliance should be:*

1 Reinforced
2 Weakened
3 Allowed to follow the actual pattern

41. *Do you think that the socialist countries have helped the government?*

1 Sufficiently
2 Insufficiently
3 DK

42. *If insufficiently, in what was it insufficient?*

1 Weak political support and no money

43. *Chilean justice is in your opinion a class justice? Why?*

1 Yes, because it puts rich above poor

44. *Mass media in Chile should:*

1 Remain in the hands of their actual owners
2 Be expropriated and administered directly by the State
3 Be expropriated but administered by the workers of each media concerned
4 Be expropriated but administered by council of workers appointed by trade unions

45 *The Chilean system of socialism should permit:*

1 Only state ownership, directly administered by the State on a centralized basis
2 State ownership in 'strategic industries' allowing some forms of private ownership as well (small and medium land-holding, small and medium industries, small and medium trade activities)
3 State ownership only, but with council of workers in charge of administration
4 State ownership as in 3, but also with some form of private ownership as in b
5 Communitary ownership, owned and administered by workers

46. *Do you think that education in Chile should be the responsibility of:*

1 Only the state
2 State and private
3 Just private

47. *Do you know the relevant issues involved in the so called Sino-Soviet conflict? If yes, please say which:*

1 Competition for power
2 Ideological reasons
3 Racial reasons
4 DK

48. *Who do you think is correct in the dispute?*

1 China
2 USSR
3 Both
4 DK

49. *Do you pay your party fees regularly?*

1 Yes
2 No

50. *It is said that within the party there are several 'tendencies' and/or groups. Some people have even given names to those groups (guatones, guatapicueros, Cuban*

lobbyists, social-democrats, Trotskyites). Do you think that those views are correct? If yes, please state which group would you belong to. If not, please elaborate

1 Yes
2 No

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